Generation 40s – 四十世代

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Next head of HKU, Zhang Xiang, must lay down a strict code of conduct for students and staff

CommentInsight & Opinion

Tony Kwok says the incoming head must guide the University of Hong Kong – once Asia’s finest – to adopt an attitude of zero tolerance towards disrespectful and rowdy conduct in the name of academic freedom


To many insider observers, the most unfortunate incident in the recent history of the University of Hong Kong was the student protest controversy over the visit of Li Keqiang, then a vice-premier, in 2011, which played a part in Professor Tsui Lap-chee’s decision to resign the vice-chancellorship in 2014.

Under Tsui’s leadership from 2002 to 2014, Hong Kong’s oldest university was acknowledged as being among the world’s best institutions, and arguably Asia’s finest. Tsui is regarded as one of the university’s best vice-chancellors; had he stayed, he could have taken the university to greater heights.

Today, the university is no longer Asia’s best, and some of its faculty and students appear more focused on taking part in social movements and political activities than on academic studies. Their irresponsible behaviour has brought the university into disrepute.

Hence, one would have expected a big welcome for the appointment of a renowned scientist to replace the outgoing incumbent vice-chancellor Peter Mathieson. Zhang Xiang, a professor of mechanical engineering at the University of California, Berkeley, a top US university, has a distinguished track record in scientific research. Yet, his appointment was greeted with disdain by some in Hong Kong simply because he was born on the mainland.

Some said his English is not good enough, even though he has taught in America for years.

Dr William Cheung Sing-wai, chairman of HKU’s academic staff association, even said: “I’m worried that under his leadership, HKU will just be another Peking University or Tsinghua University.”

In Zhang’s interview with the media, questions focused on how he would uphold the core value of academic freedom in the university. Specifically, he was asked if he would allow Hong Kong independence to be freely discussed on campus. Zhang’s answer was short and sharp: while reaffirming the importance of academic freedom, he said it has its own limits.

Zhang should lay down the limits soon after taking office. I propose that he revises the code of conduct for staff and students, drawing from the experience of UC Berkeley, where he has been teaching.

The university lists 12 values that all staff and students must uphold in its “Standards of Ethical Conduct”. They include: individual responsibility and accountability; respect for others; compliance with laws and regulations; and the proper use of university resources.

Professor Tsui Lap-chee stepped down as HKU vice-chancellor in 2014. Under his leadership, Hong Kong’s oldest university was acknowledged as Asia’s finest. Photo: Nora Tam

If the above values are incorporated into the HKU’s code of conduct, the following disgraceful activities – which have happened in various Hong Kong universities and schools over the past few years – would be banned from campus:

 Anonymous posters with provocative language displayed.

 Activities promoting Hong Kong independence, or any other political activities.

 University staff getting involved in political activities.

 Disrespectful behaviour at school events, such as a graduation ceremony.

 Abusive shouting at university council members and government officials.

Rather than taking a lenient stance, as in the past, the university should now take a zero-tolerance approach to all breaches of the code of conduct.

The new vice-chancellor faces a tough road ahead. He will need public support to prevail against the localist forces in the university and local media – the same forces that caused the university to lose one of its greatest leaders, Professor Tsui, in 2014.

Tony Kwok is an honorary fellow and adjunct professor at HKU Space, and an adviser to Our Hong Kong Foundation


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Is China planning to take Taiwan by force in 2020?

CommentInsight & Opinion

Deng Yuwen believes Beijing is coming to the conclusion that if it is to achieve reunification with Taiwan, as Xi Jinping has pledged to do at the 19th party congress, it has to do so by force, and sooner rather than later

Does Beijing have a timetable for seizing control of Taiwan? This has been a hot topic for the media and among experts on cross-strait relations. I believe such a timetable exists. If the timeline was rather vague in the past, it has become clearer now. And the US security strategy that President Donald Trump recently unveiled will hasten the pace of Beijing’s plan to take back the island, probably in 2020.

President Xi Jinping’s report at the 19th Communist Party congress offers some clues. In the address, he identified “one country, two systems” and the reunification of the motherland as a fundamental strategy of a “new era” for China. This provides a clue to Beijing’s timeline for resolving the Taiwan problem.

According to the report, the new era refers to a period from now until the middle of this century. By 2050, China is to achieve the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and become a modern socialist power.

A list of 14 items describe this new era, and one of them involves reunification with Taiwan. This means Beijing must take control of Taiwan by 2050 at the latest.

Plainly, as long as Taiwan remains outside the Chinese fold, the “great rejuvenation” of the Chinese nation cannot happen.

No surprise, then, to hear Xi say that Beijing would never allow “any individual, any organisation, any political party, at any time or by any means, to split any single piece of the Chinese territory”.

Last month, a Chinese diplomat’s fighting words over the idea of the US sending navy ships to Taiwan were also revealing. Li Kexin, a minister at the Chinese embassy in Washington, warned that port-of-call exchanges between the US and Taiwan would not be tolerated.

“The day a US Navy vessel arrives in Kaohsiung is the day that our People’s Liberation Army unifies Taiwan with military force,” he told mainland media.

While it is unlikely the PLA would really start a war over a US Navy visit to Taiwan, the words reflect a consistent belief of Chinese leaders: that Taiwan has to be taken back by force.

Since Xi came to power, the party has been open about its wish for the PLA to be battle-ready. No doubt the army’s first target would be Taiwan.

Also, Xi’s sense of calling would never allow him to tolerate Taiwan’s indefinite separation from the mainland. Whatever one may think of Xi, most people would agree that he is driven by a strong sense of national pride.

That is why, as soon as he came to power, he launched the “Chinese dream” campaign and set out the goal of achieving national rejuvenation. In the party congress address, he painted a picture of the new era that reflected his thinking and linguistic style.

As a leader who is bent on raising China’s global stature to a level that rivals the nation’s glory years in Han and Tang times, Xi would surely not tolerate an indefinite split between Taiwan and the mainland.

Nonetheless, the points raised so far only signal that Beijing has a timetable in mind to unify Taiwan with China, but they do not explain why the PLA could move to take Taiwan by force in 2020.

A combination of factors could point to a military confrontation.

They include Trump’s labelling of China as a strategic rival in his administration’s national security strategy; Beijing’s worry about the pro-independence movement in Taiwan and its belief that it now has the ability to resolve the Taiwan problem once and for all; a misjudgment by Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen; and Xi’s sense of his own legacy.

First of all, why would Beijing opt for unification by force, rather than through the peaceful negotiation it has always championed? There are four reasons. First, after extending economic help to the island for years, Beijing has still failed to win the hearts and minds of its people. Instead, cross-strait relations have deteriorated.

Second, as one generation of Taiwanese replaces another, the “Chinese” identity among the people will only grow weaker.

Third, the influence of Taiwan’s political parties is waning. Even if the Kuomintang wins back power, it would not be in a position to lead cross-strait unification.

Fourth, more and more Chinese are calling for unification by force.

Thus, though on the surface Beijing has continued to call for a peaceful reunification, it has in fact ditched the idea.

As Beijing believes it has to use force to reunite with Taiwan, the next step would be to find a good time to do so. The year 2020 offers such an opportunity.

That’s the year when China would be approaching the first of its “two centenary” goals – the establishment of a xiaokang, or moderately prosperous, society by 2021, the 100th year of the founding of the Communist Party.

This would act as a driving force for China to take back Taiwan by force. If China becomes a well-off nation with Taiwan in its fold, it would mean a historic achievement for Xi.

Next, Trump’s national security strategy not only labels China and Russia as America’s “strategic rivals”, it also pledges to maintain strong ties with Taiwan. This will quicken Beijing’s plans to take back Taiwan by force.

In reality, China and the US are, of course, strategic rivals. But by stating it in its security strategy, the US indicates a shift in its long-term policy on China, letting it be known that it would seek to contain China rather than work with it. This would lead Beijing to conclude that it should resolve the Taiwan problem sooner rather than later.

Is the PLA ready for such a battle? In a recent interview, China analyst Ian Easton said he believed the Chinese military would not be ready for an attack in 2020 because of the slow pace of military reform. However, many Chinese analysts would not agree with that view.

At the 19th party congress last October, Xi pledged a major upgrade in mechanisation and the communications systems in the armed forces by 2020, which would greatly enhance the country’s strategic capabilities.

By 2035, he said, China would have completely modernised its defence forces; by the middle of the century, it would become a world-class military force.

The military has come a long way since reforms were launched four years ago. And fighting a war would be the best way to gauge its improvements.

In today’s China, more and more people are advocating the use of force to unify Taiwan with the mainland.

A series of military drills focused on Taiwan in recent days has also raised speculation that the mainland is preparing itself for a military invasion. It is likely that such “encirclement patrols” might become routine.

All is set for Beijing to unify with Taiwan by force, except for one thing – a pretext or a reason to take action. Emboldened by US support, the Taiwanese government that Tsai leads may well test China’s bottom line by further cementing its ties with America, such as with the proposed exchanges between US and Taiwanese navies.

Finally, whether Beijing decides to mobilise against Taiwan in 2020 will still depend on the decision of its leaders.

Xi may be tempted to secure the historic achievement of reunification as part of his legacy. Furthermore, if war breaks out, the peacetime systems and procedures will have to be set aside.

This will allow Xi to stay in power beyond his expected retirement in 2022, to give him more time to work on realising the Chinese dream of rejuvenation.

If Beijing takes up arms against Taiwan in 2020, there will be formidable changes for East Asia and the world. North Korea may also risk waging war on South Korea, if its nuclear capabilities are not eradicated earlier.

I do not want to see war breaking out. For this reason, we must pay more attention to what happens in 2020.

Deng Yuwen is a researcher at the Charhar Institute think tank. This article is translated from Chinese

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Four challenges ‘Greater Bay Area’ planners must overcome to ensure success

CommentInsight & Opinion

Feng Da Hsuan and Liang Hai Ming highlight some issues for planners to consider for the Greater Bay Area, including how to tackle the complexities of the massive project, attract talent and prevent a brain drain in smaller cities, and ensure a safety net for failure

The release of a “Greater Bay Area” development plan for linking Hong Kong and Macau with nine cities in Guangdong province is expected to be released early this year. The plan may be a sign of China’s ascent, but this area will be starkly different from, for example, the San Francisco, New York and Tokyo bay areas. While it is all within one nation, it also links two “systems”, three currencies and multiple cities. This makes the plan highly convoluted, and such complexity could pose far more challenges than those found in other bay areas.

Here are four potential issues. First, because the Greater Bay Area consists of cities in Guangdong province, plus Hong Kong and Macau, any kind of amalgamation will be one of multiplicities, rather than natural affinities, and this could mean additional obstacles to the flow of talent, finance, logistics, information and so on.

It has been suggested that the euro-zone experience could provide a good lesson where, to coordinate nations of vast differences as seamlessly as possible, it was necessary to jointly organise and empower a “coordination team” to overcome the difficulties. Indeed, having such a team, at least in principle, should lead to greater affinities. This is why a single currency, the euro, and a single political system known as the European Parliament were established.

One obvious difficulty that the euro zone faced is that the economically weaker nations within it, such as Greece and Portugal, raised their debt levels greatly while under the euro-zone protection umbrella. The actions of these nations resulted in a series of debt crises which led to doubts about the sustainability of the euro zone, roiling financial markets, including those outside Europe. The European debt crisis and Brexit, plus the drama of potential exits by Greece and the Netherlands, have been directly or indirectly due to such actions.

These nations have chosen to leave, or have considered leaving, the euro zone so they can individually decide on exchange rates in order to increase exports and promote economic development. How to overcome or prevent the same fate in the Greater Bay Area is something that needs to be addressed upfront.

Also, the Greater Bay Area may not be able to attract talent within China and worldwide for sustainable development. It will take much more than just money and new projects to make the area a global centre of technological innovation, advanced manufacturing and maritime, finance and trade; what is needed is talent across the board and a global mindset.

There are two main issues to address in this respect. The first is to understand that the vision and ideas of foreign talent, especially people from Europe and North America, are quite different from those in China. Besides requiring high-paying jobs, comfortable living conditions and a pleasant working environment, these people also want a clear project mission, a step-by-step plan and well-designed project funding.

Unfortunately, this is the opposite of how Chinese operate. Generally speaking, while Chinese may have an initial grand vision, they tend to “plan along the way” rather than long-term and without already designated funds. The leadership of this grand development scheme will need great wisdom to bridge the gap.

Second, in euro-zone nations, due to workers’ low wages in the “have-not” nations, talent and indigenous finance tend to flow naturally toward the “haves”, causing a downward spiral for the others, making them even poorer. A similar situation may occur in the Greater Bay Area, where talent in cities outside Guangzhou, Hong Kong and Macau could flow towards those three. This could force such cities to institute favourable policies to retain indigenous talent, which could widen the gap between rich and poor in those cities, resulting in social instability.

The Greater Bay Area could also affect the surrounding regions. Developing the bay area could have a beneficial effect on surrounding, less-developed areas. However, an undesirable “echo effect” may occur; that is, production in those areas could flow back into the Greater Bay Area because of the emphasis on its development, causing the surrounding regions to suffer a loss of resources and production.

Finally, to become a truly successful world-class technological region, there must be a safety net for failure.

Across the world, whether in science, technology or entrepreneurship, failure is the norm and success the exception. If a region allows innovators to fail without a safety net to allow them to rebound, it will not only destroy innovation but also the innovative spirit. This safety net could be in the form of the protection of company dissolution, bank arrears as well as tax burdens. In the United States, San Diego is a successful biotech innovation centre, and one reason for its success is its robust safety net.

It is also important to underscore that the Greater Bay Area will not be the sole new innovation centre in China. Without a safety net, those who want to and are able to rebound may be attracted to other centres. It must be remembered that failure is not forever. After all, innovators who are willing to try again probably have enough energy, creativity and wisdom to succeed in the future.

It is our earnest hope that the Greater Bay Area development plan will address some or all of the challenges mentioned here.

We firmly believe that the designers have the wisdom, experience and vision to create a successful Greater Bay Area with Chinese characteristics, and propel it into the ranks of world-class bay areas internationally.

Feng Da Hsuan is senior adviser of the China Silk Road iValley Research Institute. Liang Hai Ming is chairman and chief economist of the institute


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《南華早報》配合中國近年的崛起,其使命是「引領全球關於中國的對話」。它正努力改革,首先是在體制文化上把編輯部全面數字(數碼)化。其次是在結構上將製作傳統報紙的人手縮減至編輯部全體員工的一成,而且將紙媒的重點放在提供獨家原創新聞和深度報道。第三是在技術上成立了數據分析部門,幫助了解讀者流量和熱門話題、優化工作決策,及尋找更有效的文章標題,以提升搜索引擎中的排名。最後是在內容上着重多媒體及互動性,從文字和圖片邁向社交媒體、facebook live、虛擬現實等內容。



個案之二是台灣的《聯合報》。其「內容長」(chief content officer)柔美月表示,該報的方向是強化數位戰力及擴大品牌價值。他們在2008年提出「雙引擎策略」,包括「數位回流」和「多元營收」,希望用多元事業經營來支持媒體的永續發展。「數位回流」是指不同部門互相協作,其中包括影音、行動服務、數據發展、詮釋數位及新媒體中心。而「多元營收」的單位包括聯合數位文創、健康、教育、娛樂生活、「udn買東西」。









全面數碼 跨越報業






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What tiny Luxembourg can teach ageing Hong Kong about labour mobility in the Greater Bay Area

CommentInsight & Opinion

Lucy Kwan and Rex Wong Yat Chun say Luxembourg can be a model for Hong Kong as it tackles a static demographic and labour structure. Hong Kong must take advantage of its closeness to the Pearl River Delta by embracing openness through the flow of ‘frontier workers’


Hong Kong is faced with a labour mismatch problem. Industries such as construction and catering complain of chronic worker shortages, while Hong Kong’s youngsters are encouraged to choose a “decent” career in our pillar industries. Our education system, therefore, oversupplies white-collar workers but undersupplies blue-collar workers, who are seen to have less bright socio-economic prospects. As a result, our talent pool is imbalanced and cannot react according to the actual needs of industries.

Many developed cities in the world can draw their talent pool from surrounding areas. However, Hong Kong is special. Currently, there seems to be a lack of concerted and proactive efforts to increase labour mobility in both directions. Hong Kong should form a conurbation with neighbouring cities so that citizens within the economic circle can freely move from their residence to their workplace.

The completion of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau bridge and the high-speed railway may realise such a vision. Luxembourg gives us a template.

Despite limited space and population, Luxembourg is one of the world’s most influential financial centres. On aggregate income per capita, Luxembourg ranks among the top economies in the OECD group of wealthy nations. Such economic miracles would not have been achieved if only locals were involved. In fact, nearly half of its population of just 500,000 are foreigners. Moreover, nearly half of the total national employments (more than 170,000 workers) involve “frontier workers”, that is, they reside in neighbouring countries and commute to work, usually daily.

The Luxembourg government has made huge efforts to facilitate cross-border employment. For example, frontier workers can come and go without any restriction if they are European Union or European Free Trade Association nationals. If they are third-country nationals, they must hold a valid work permit issued by certain countries, as well as a valid Luxembourg employment contract bearing a clear statement from their Luxembourg employer that they work for a specific number of days of the month.

Cross-border workers pay taxes in Luxembourg for income generated within the country. To avoid double taxation, Luxembourg has agreements in place with its three neighbours, France, Germany and Belgium. Cross-border workers in Luxembourg pay their part of social security in Luxembourg just like residents, which is lower than in the three adjacent countries.

Luxembourg’s success exemplifies the realisation of a high degree of cross-border mobility. It suggests a bright future for the integration of the labour markets in Hong Kong and adjacent cities such as Shenzhen, Macau and Zhuhai. These four southernmost cities in the “Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau Greater Bay Area” could become the core of the area, and our labour markets would complement each other and be integrated. From Hong Kong’s perspective, industries such as construction and catering could employ workers from our neighbouring cities.

Also, our university graduates would find many more opportunities in the region and it would be easier for them to go where they are both needed and valued.

Hong Kong’s economic and social issues resulting from an ageing population and static growth might be more easily solved.

To facilitate such mobility, we should first accelerate the development of new commercial and residential areas near the border, namely the North Lantau New Town, the Lok Ma Chau Loop area, and the Northeast New Territories.

It would hopefully become a commercial area that would attract companies, especially technology start-ups, to set up their headquarters. Also, the number of border control points and their capacity to handle the rising traffic volume should be expanded.

Secondly, the social security and taxation system for frontier workers within the region should be harmonised.

Workers may live on the mainland but still enjoy the best business environment in the world, including favourable tax rates, simple registration procedures and the established legal protection in Hong Kong.

Hong Kong’s competitiveness does not come from natural resources, but its people. We need a vibrant and flexible talent pool to sustain our unique competitiveness. Therefore, we should not turn a blind eye to our static and ageing demographic and labour structure. Our proximity to the Pearl River Delta gives us a geographical advantage in supporting our economic growth as well as exerting our influence.

Lucy Kwan is an honorary assistant professor at the Department of Statistics and Actuarial Science at the University of Hong Kong. Rex Wong Yat Chun is a third-year student majoring in economics and finance at HKU