Generation 40s – 四十世代

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問題超越歐洲中國 研究揭港生「網癮」危機

Hong Kong Economic Journal
C03 | 優質教育 | 教育講論 | By 黃穎詩 |
2013-10-05

若你有青少年子女每天都上網多句鐘,他們很大機會已經上網成癖;而一項調查更顯示,家長們還有多一重的憂慮,就是子女可能也有失眠和抑鬱問題。

在香港,沉迷上網的青少年中,兩個人就有一人可能患上失眠症;不僅如此,他們亦較易抑鬱。這是一項調查所發現的結果── 過度上網、失眠和抑鬱之間,三者有着密切的關聯。

有關研究去年刊載於《睡眠研究學刊》內,發現受訪的青少年中,17%是「互聯網癮患者」,其中有52%即一半人出現睡眠問題;並且有59%即十人之中就有六人抑鬱。

問卷形式進行相關研究

研究以問卷形式進行,共有七百一十人回應,他們為本港一所中學的男女學生。受訪學生由十歲至二十歲,被問及每天用多少時間上網、睡眠習慣及精神健康狀況,從而評估他們是否患上網癮、有否抑鬱及失眠問題。

這是首個探視上網成癖對香港青少年失眠及抑鬱所造成影響的研究,由香港教育學院心理研究學系副教授黃穎詩教授及研究員張利文聯手進行。雖然研究團隊不能確定當中的必然因果關係,但黃教授指出,研究顯示上網成癖跟失眠和抑鬱之間有着重大關聯,研究數據意味着失眠、網癮和抑鬱之間可能存在着複雜的機制。該項研究在年前進行,為期一年。

逾半網癮者識別為抑鬱

調查發現本地上網成癖的青少年在「匹茲堡睡眠品質指標量表」中,全數七項指標元素的得分,較沒有患上網癮的青少年「顯著較差」。這個量表是以問卷形式,評估在一個月內的睡眠質素及睡眠受打擾情況。

報告指出,網癮患者跟非網癮患者比較,前者有較長得多的睡眠潛伏期、較低的睡眠效率、更頻密使用安眠藥物(13% 至少一周服用一次藥物)、較差的睡眠質素、更多睡眠受打擾情況及日間官能障礙。研究結果顯示,香港青少年平均要等待21.56分鐘後才能入睡,而平均睡眠時間為7.68小時。

過去的研究指出,網癮患者可能因為夜睡而導致失眠,但黃教授的研究就顯示,網癮患者與非網癮患者的睡眠時間沒有顯著分別。「這些矛盾的研究結果啟示了失眠和網癮之間的關係,可能不是欠缺睡眠的簡單解釋可以說明,而可能當中有更複雜的機制,牽涉到心理、認知及生理的過程。」黃教授說。

日益惡化的全球問題

研究報告顯示,網癮者較非網癮者出現較多抑鬱徵狀,網癮者中59% 被識別為「抑鬱」。然而,黃教授指出,失眠與網癮未必是抑鬱的主要成因,並引述其他因素如自我形象低落、孤單及缺乏社會支援等。但黃教授仍然表示:「我們發現網癮與失眠同時出現的情況很高,而這兩種問題又與青少年的抑鬱現象有重大的關聯。」

互聯網癮癖是指「心理上依賴互聯網」,是全世界的青少年群體中日益惡化的精神健康問題。但黃教授的研究顯示,在香港,青少年強迫性地使用互聯網的情況,較其他許多國家更為普遍。

香港青少年的網癮普遍率為17%,遠較其他地方高── 過去的研究顯示,這個比率在意大利是5.4%、挪威1.98%、台灣7.5%,而中國大陸是2.4%至5.5%。

但對於是青少年因失眠而導致上網,還是上網引致失眠?黃教授建議有必要再進行研究,找出失眠、網癮和抑鬱的因果關係。有關的問題是可以預防的。

黃教授呼籲政府在以學校為本的健康檢查計劃中,加入檢視使用互聯網的元素,作為防預措施;她亦建議當局在推廣健康睡眠習慣時,教導公眾有關上網成癮對睡眠和精神健康的影響。黃穎詩教授續說:「在全球愈來愈多青少年出現網癮與睡眠問題的情況下,我們希望這項研究可以引發更多進一步的研究,以便探視這個重要的問題。」

研究報告︰黃穎詩
教院心理研究學系副教授
文章提供︰香港教育學院


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Chief executive chosen by universal suffrage can bridge divisions in Hong Kong

South China Morning Post
Business›Economy
THE VIEW
2014-10-15

Richard Wong

For years, Hong Kong’s tale of two narratives played together nicely, but transformation in the 90s and events since have changed all the rules

The student protest and Occupy movement is, on the surface, motivated by democratic ideals. But more fundamentally, it is a sign that the deepening economic and social contradictions in Hong Kong brought about by the mainland’s opening and economic globalisation have reached a tipping point.

For many years, there was a balance between two narratives on Hong Kong’s future development – the “establishment narrative” and the “bottom-up narrative”. This balance emerged in the aftermath of the 1966-67 riots, which had many origins including the critical underlying issue of a rapidly rising industrial economy. The government sought to deal with the deep contradictions that emerged back then by healing rifts in society and giving industrial capitalism a kinder face.

The social sector received funding support and a greater role in public policy, while the business and economic sector continued to play the dominant role in policy matters. This political narrative became embedded in the Basic Law, which was promulgated in 1990.

But in the 1990s, Hong Kong’s economy underwent another colossal transformation into a service economy. A new political narrative was needed to articulate the economic and social challenges of the new era. It became imperative that both sides worked together to resolve these challenges. Unfortunately, this failed to happen.

Adherents of the “bottom-up narrative”, who were associated with the social sector, had little understanding of the challenges of economic transformation and were not interested in articulating an economic policy agenda. For them, democratic elections became a political means to advance their social policy agenda.

Fears of populist encroachment from this approach drove supporters of the “establishment narrative”, associated with the business and economic sector, closer to Beijing, which had fallen out with the adherents of the “bottom-up narrative” over the June 4, 1989, crackdown and the attempted enactment of Article 23 in 2003.

Beijing attempted to undercut the latter group’s success with voters by relying on sympathetic organisations to reach out to the grassroots and compete in setting the social policy agenda and securing resources. But this unsettled the old modus operandi that had been in place since the 1970s.

The “bottom-up narrative” was not the only one straining in the face of Hong Kong’s socioeconomic transformation in the ’90s. Political gridlock and the perception of growing inequality and diminishing opportunities for the middle class led the public to become increasingly persuaded that there were deep flaws in the “establishment narrative”. The “establishment narrative” had worked well under British rule because Hong Kong was not a democracy but ruled by a governor sent from London who could both befriend the local business and professional elite and hold them at bay.

But with the arrival of 1997 came the need to elect the chief executive from within Hong Kong. This changed the rules of political engagement in a fundamental way.

Beijing allowed the local elites to play a larger and important role in the political process – despite the central government’s own practice, dating back to Han times, of rotating regional administrators to ensure justice and minimise corruption opportunities. In effect, this strategy has entrusted the governance of a capitalist system to the capitalists.

Government in capitalist societies is meant to be a neutral referee and maintain a level playing field for all. Limited government reduces the potential benefits from rent-seeking activities and makes the capitalist system more robust. When capitalists are put in charge of creating wealth, they contribute to prosperity; but when they are put in charge of running capitalist government, they contribute to instability.

Since 1997, the business and professional elite who support the “establishment narrative” have increasingly appeared to be defending their own interests rather than those of society.

Adherents of the “bottom-up narrative”, for their part, have made the fatal mistake of antagonising Beijing excessively and unnecessarily without accomplishing any political objectives. They also have become increasingly fragmented. Their main achievement has been to discredit the “establishment narrative” with political rhetoric, which has helped their radical wing to recruit frustrated youths.

But it is not surprising that Beijing is taking the larger share of the blame for the conflict between the two narratives. Beijing’s failure has been to tilt so heavily in favour of one side. Only a chief executive elected through universal suffrage and accountable to the broad public can hope to bridge the gap between the two political narratives.

Richard Wong Yue-chim is Philip Wong Kennedy Wong Professor in Political Economy at the University of Hong Kong


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怎樣才算成年

Hong Kong Economic Journal
C01 | 今日焦點 | 忽然文化 | By 占飛 |
2013-10-05

魚活在水中,不覺水的存在。人活在空氣中,不覺空氣的存在。現代人活在社會中,對許多社會規範、價值觀念,雖然知覺其存在,卻視作理所當然,天經地義。其實,這些規範和價值都是人為的,某程度上都是隨意的。換句話說,時代改變了,那些規範和價值亦會隨之改變。在新規範、新價值下成長的一代,便會覺得新規範、新價值是天經地義。何謂成年,亦可作如是觀。

這些年,「孩童化成年人」(kidult)已成社會熱切討論的話題,且有定論:今天的青少年,生理已「成年」,但心理及生活仍然停留在青春期,欠缺獨立自主的能力和意志,依賴父母照顧(有些是自願依賴,有些是無法擺脫依賴),依然是「大細路」。出現這個現象的共識是:直升機父母和怪獸家長責任最大。青少年不敢或不肯反叛、擺脫家長,亦有責任。亦有大學教授(如英國的Frank Furedi)指是社會將年輕人「孩童化」。

回顧歷史,不同社會和不同時代對何謂「成年」,定義都稍有不同。相同的是,各地「成年」的年紀愈推愈後。今天,大部分社會都跟隨西方,把十二歲前定義為「童年」。英國1870年推行強迫教育,所有五歲至十二歲的兒童都要入學,十二歲才畢業,是謂童年的結束。十三至十九歲是所謂少年(teenagers)。十九歲中學畢業,可以喝酒、駕車、投票、雙方同意的性行為合法等,便是成年。

猶太人卻一直保留古風,男孩十三歲便行「成年禮」(Bar Mitzvah),女孩是十二歲。行禮後,便是「成年」人,要對所作所為負全責。猶太人有句話:孩子過了「成年禮」,父母便鬆一口氣了。往後,孩子犯上「宗教上的罪」(sin),父母不用再向耶和華負責了。非洲不少民族的「成年」定義都是十三歲。

成年時間表

由周朝至清代,男子二十而冠才算成年。《禮記.曲禮上》寫「二十曰弱冠」,要束髮帶冠。而孩子在十歲前還是「幼」童。《禮記.曲禮上》說:「人生十年曰幼,學」,即是說直至十歲是孩子的「學習期」。《幼學瓊林》是幼童的課本,熟讀那二萬多字,不單天文、地理、生物、歷史、文學的通識豐富,而且中文水平肯定好過今天的中學甚至大學畢業生。有趣的問題是,在十歲至二十歲、在幼與冠之間的青春期,青少年幹什麼?

至於可以發生性行為的年紀,英文所謂age of consent,更會使今人大吃一驚,視為野蠻、不文明。古人大概認為,男女只要生理上成熟── 即是女的有月經,男的可以射精── 便可以有性行為。《紅樓夢》裏寫賈寶玉初試雲雨情,只有十三四歲而已。古中國女子「破瓜之年」是二八年華,即是十六歲。英國更離譜,1678年的法定age of consent是十歲,到1875 年才定為十三歲,1885 年增至十六歲。但美國一些州在1890年代依然維持十歲。梵蒂岡則是十二歲。到1983年的CanonLaw,梵蒂岡才把合法的結婚年齡提高至男子十六歲,女子十四歲。

什麼年紀才算成年是隨時代而愈來愈遲。美國的社會學家稱之為「不斷改變的成年時間表」。這百多年來,由十四歲延至十六歲再延至十八歲。聯合國1989年通過《兒童權利公約》,界定十八歲以下的都是兒童,受公約保護。今天一些大學一年級生可能還不夠十八歲,還是兒童。僅僅超過十八歲者,剛剛「成年」而已。父母陪同面試、上學、視察宿舍,有什麼大不了到值得嚴厲指責或搖頭嗟歎的?

據英國報章報道,有學者建議把「成年」的定義由十八歲增至二十五歲。若然成事,今時今日的「孩童化成年人」見工、上班也帶同父母,找到職業、有異性伴侶仍然跟父母同住,一周五晚回家食「屋企飯」,買樓靠父母出首期等,便不用再受千夫所指矣!

撰文︰占飛

Hong Kong Economic Journal
C01 | 今日焦點 |
2013-10-05

小飛俠綜合症

在二十世紀以前,只有紈絝子弟才有福氣當「孩童化成年人」。窮人的孩子早當家,不是當學徒、外出工作,就是料理家務、照顧弟妹。今天五六十歲的老香港,他們的青春期不是在學校而是在工作間度過。這解釋了為什麼他們對今天的「孩童化成年人」那麼看不順眼。在他們的經驗裏,自己十五六歲已經「成年」過成年人。今天的大學生還是個「大細路」、「黐」住父母,當然是「離晒大譜」!

有些評論甚至認為這是不正常甚至是病態── 即所謂「小飛俠綜合症」(Peter Pan syndrome)。童話裏的彼得潘是永長不大的孩子。這類評論忘記了:何謂「成年」是個「社會約定」。「青春期」的想法也許古已有之,但最早提出來作為心理學概念的應是1904年出版的《青春期》一書,作者是美國心理學先驅賀賢(Stanley Hall)。此君創立了美國心理學學會(American PsychologicalAssociation),且是第一任主席。他創辦了《美國心理學刊》,是個佛洛伊德派,信奉「發展心理學」理論。

發展心理學

「發展心理學」的基本信條是,人的心理和生理一樣,在不同年齡經歷不同的發展階段。人要經歷五期發展,分別是口腔期、肛門期、性器官期、潛伏期及生殖期等等。任何人未能在適當時候脫離一個發展期,順利過渡至另一個發展期,就可能患上「精神病」。停留在口腔期的人,長大後可能會有酗酒、上煙癮、暴食、嘮叨等毛病。

今人大多把「發展心理學」的基本信條看作理所當然,且可以清晰地界定由幾多歲到幾多歲是某一階段。所謂「長大」就是由一個階段成功過渡到另一個階段。不能過渡或遲了過渡就是不正常。在批評時下的「孩童化成年人」為不正常時,背後假定了「發展心理學」的基本信條是對的。可是,這其實只是個信念,不是經過科學證實的「定理」,甚至是個不可能由科學證實的「猜想」或「假設」而已!賀賢曾認為獨生子女因沒有兄弟姐妹,窒礙了其中一個發展期,所以「獨生子女本身便是病。」你能同意嗎?


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Halting the tide of online violence

South China Morning Post
Comment›Insight & Opinion
LEADER
SCMP Editorial
2014-10-15

A Google or YouTube search of the words “beheading video” brings up pages of images of brutality and violence of the most stomach-churning kind. The Middle East extremist group Islamic State features prominently, its videos of executions of Westerners captured in Iraq and Syria being posted to gain followers and incite fear. They are so widely shared that even when the giants of the internet remove them and shut down accounts, they can still be readily tracked down by those eager to look. The European Union’s teaming with the top social media and technology firms to find a strategy to combat their spread could not have been more timely.

EU officials and representatives of Facebook, Google, which owns YouTube, Twitter and Microsoft, behind the search engine Bing, met in Luxembourg last week to find a way of making the internet safer. The American companies already block online content and behaviour determined to be inappropriate, but each has a different approach. Social media firms tend to be less intrusive, letting users freely express opinions and share photos. But Islamic State’s gruesome videos of the beheadings of two American journalists and two Britons (an aid worker and an aid volunteer), prompted the companies to be more than usually proactive. The graphic nature of the images, the messages they sent and the need for sensitivity towards the victims’ families necessitated prompt removal.

But these were headline-grabbing news stories with identifiable victims. Lesser sites with little or no oversight now host the images and they are reposted as fast as they are taken down. The internet is awash with similarly disturbing videos and pictures of lesser events elsewhere in the Middle East and world. Without a complaint, they will remain viewable.

The open internet and lack of regulation makes stumbling upon content that is offensive or violent inevitable. Policing is challenging – 100 hours of video is posted each minute on YouTube alone. The right to inform and the need for freedom of expression makes deciding what should be blocked a matter of balance, ethics and moral judgment.

Clicks and page views are important to websites; the extreme and excessive gains instant attention. Preventing the spread of content is only a partial solution. The European gathering agreed a more productive approach lies in training, education and awareness. That is a more viable way forward that governments and internet firms should explore and fund.


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除了酒精,掌心裏還有歲月

Hong Kong Economic Journal
C05 | 城市智庫 | 6角都市 | By Joe |
2013-10-05

現代都市,男女或然碰撞,究竟會拼湊出6角蜂巢般的完美,還是注定如6瓣櫻花般凋落……

9 月的陽光結出10 月的果實。上海的秋天,終於來了。「秋天的夜裏,請你不要一個人飲酒,會着涼。」某一首古老的日本十七字俳句如此寫道。

算一算,也有半年多沒喝過酒了。於是打電話給Roy,「喝一杯?」「好,喝一杯,」R o y 欣然應邀。年歲漸長之後,喝酒多是和三五至交老友在家中淺酌。對於商務場合的觥籌交錯,我已經敬謝不敏。中國的酒桌文化極其反人類。特別是在北方,種種酒桌惡習簡直集這個國家五千年糟粕之大成。一方面以強迫不善飲的客人喝醉為樂,一方面又以自己能大口牛飲為榮,徒自暴殄天物。

不為所動

所以每到這種場合,我寧可滴酒不沾。哪怕是一樽傳奇年份的名莊酒擺在面前,也決絕地不為所動。

但一次次在商務宴請上看到那些絕世佳釀被打開,連瓶醒都懶得等就分杯落肚,前三後四的酒到杯乾。每到此時都忍不住生出隱隱的心痛。看着那樽酒在燈光下掩映的嫣紅,我彷彿看到一個長於深閨的麗人。她一生學習琴棋書畫,在練習刺繡的間隙停住機杼,仰望馬頭牆外的依依垂柳,想像自己將要嫁給的那個騎白馬而來,文能寫詩、武能舞劍的翩翩少年,嘴角輕輕揚起甜蜜的弧度。

可是某一天, 戰火席捲九州。馬蹄聲響起處,來的不是她的翩翩佳婿。破門而入的,是一群流亡至此的草寇。古董花瓶和紅木桌椅碎了一地,細軟和金銀被擄走。麗人像一卷破棉被般捆在馬鞍之後,絕塵而去。在亂石崗上,那一隻隻沾着血和泥的油膩大手,粗暴地撕去她柔軟華貴的絲綢衣衫。在深秋的寒風裏,她緊閉着雙眼瑟瑟發抖。淚珠順着雪白的臉龐滴進黃土,她求死不能。

有句話說,「自古名將如美人,不許人間見白頭。」其實名酒也如美人,不該落入紅塵俗世中,各懷鬼胎的飯局。

和紅酒結緣,始於在澳洲讀書時去一間酒莊做短工的經歷。新人到酒莊的第一晚,照例有個歡迎派對。我端着啤酒對老闆遞過來的紅酒杯搖搖頭。「A r e y o uunderage?」老闆促狹地擠擠眼。在澳洲農夫的眼裏,啤酒和可樂一樣,都是軟飲。

為了證明我不是underage,在此後的兩個月裏,我們飲遍了酒莊裏的各種窖藏。白天給葡萄藤修枝剪蔓、驅蟲、翻整土地。晚上,來自世界各地,操着各種腔調英語的短工背包族們就聚在南十字座的星空下,人手一杯。讓溫潤如寶石的酒漿,跟隨着天南地北的笑話進入喉嚨,直到恍然間覺得自己已經和星空的軌迹融為一體。

人的一生,其實就是場飲食之旅。釀酒的果實,來自陽光和泥土,其實是人和天地的一個連接點。因此我對美酒始終都懷着一種深深的敬畏感。

杯酒在握,友人在側。飲酒不是為了貪圖一時間的麻醉,不是期許味蕾綻放的快感,只是為了尋找那份對無聲歲月和有情天地的,敬畏。 Joe @ 6角都市