Generation 40s – 四十世代

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Why the West and Japan should stop preaching to a rising China

South China Morning Post
Comment›Insight & Opinion
2017-07-07

Jean-Pierre Lehmann

Jean-Pierre Lehmann says the imperialist powers of old should acknowledge their own bloody history of plunder and exploitation, and work with Beijing to find a path to a peaceful rise, which so far is unprecedented

This year marks the anniversaries of a number of Asian historical landmarks. July 1 was the 20th anniversary of the handover of sovereignty over Hong Kong from the UK to China. August 8 will mark the 50th anniversary of the Asean declaration, the founding document of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. This Friday, July 7, marks the 80th anniversary of the Japanese invasion of China, triggering the Pacific war that lasted until Japan’s surrender on September 2, 1945.

July 7 should be a day for reflection. Such was the case on June 6 three years ago, on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of D-Day in Normandy, when the French president François Hollande hosted, among others, US president Barack Obama, Britain’s David Cameron, Canada’s Stephen Harper, Germany’s Angela Merkel and Russia’s Vladimir Putin. This was one further indication that, while there are tensions in the Atlantic, the breakout of war, as occurred twice last century, is extremely unlikely.

Over the decades since the end of the second world war, there has been a great deal of dialogue, confidence-building and the establishment of solid institutions. Germany, for all the atrocities it committed, has been an exemplary European citizen and is arguably the Atlantic’s greatest guarantor of peace, just as it has proffered unconditional apologies.

Just as Germany has been the solution for peace in the Atlantic, Japan remains a critical problem for peace in the Pacific. In light of the composition and conduct of the Japanese government – with, inter alia, the Defence Minister Tomomi Inada paying regular visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, a sort of mausoleum for Japanese war criminals – it is highly unlikely that there will be reflection, let alone apology.

The Pacific war and its many ramifications tend to be ignored in Japanese education and public discourse generally. July 7 will not be marked by public forums among Japanese leaders, let alone with their Chinese, Korean, Singaporean or Filipino counterparts.

Instead, we hear of Japanese kindergartens spreading anti-Chinese and anti-Korean xenophobic messages and hotel chain proprietors (Toshio Motoya of APA) distributing in all rooms copies of his writings in which he denies the Nanking massacre occurred and claims that the Korean “comfort women” were not sexual slaves but prostitutes.

But the lessons from July 7, 1937 extend beyond Japan. The 21st century is witnessing the rise of another great global power: China. Though there has been a good deal of debate among Chinese intellectuals on the implications of great power rise, illustrated in the seminal 2005 article by Zheng Bijian (鄭必堅), “China’s Peaceful Rise to Great Power Status”, there has been little reflection among the other great powers on how they might contribute.

If one looks at, for example, the current membership of the G7, all the countries, with the sole exception of Canada, achieved great power status through war, conquest, plunder, imperialism, exploitation, enslavement, and so on. Thus, while Japan is a major problem for peace in the Pacific, its warmongering corresponded to a pattern set by other G7 members, including the US, Britain, France, Germany and Italy – and indeed by others including the Netherlands, Belgium and Russia.

While it has become seemingly pervasive for the Western powers and Japan to mount their high moral horses and admonish China that it should “play by the rules”, they fail to explain why at the time of their rise to great power there were no rules or, if there were, they were egregiously flouted.

Thus, the eloquent 1839 letter by the Canton commissioner Lin Zexu (林則徐) to Queen Victoria, imploring her to stop her subjects from forcefully infesting China with opium, was contemptuously ignored. Throughout the 19th and most of the 20th centuries, the “great” powers plundered the planet, including of course China. What rules were the British and French playing by as they pillaged the Beijing Summer Palace in 1860?

Nor is the behaviour of the Western powers just ancient history. American atrocities perpetrated against Vietnamese and Laotians continued into the third quarter of last century. As depicted in the excellent book by Viet Thanh Nguyen, Nothing Ever Dies: Vietnam and the Memory of War, in fact the US has been pretty much continuously at war throughout the second half of the 20th century and most recently in the 21st, with the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

One of the most compelling recent publications on the rise of China is by Geoff Dyer, The Contest of the Century: The New Era of Competition with China, in which he draws compelling parallels between the rise of the US as a great power in the late 19th and early 20th centuries – manifest destiny, the Spanish-American war of 1898-99, resulting in the colonisation of the Philippines, and so on – and the rise of China in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. The 1823 Monroe Doctrine, seeking to establish a US exclusive sphere of influence over Latin American, ultimately came to concrete fruition a few decades later with, among other things, the metamorphosis of the Caribbean as an “American lake”. This, Dyer suggests, is comparable to what China is aiming to do vis-à-vis Southeast Asia generally and the South China Sea [9] in particular – that is, that it should become a Chinese lake.

The argument that these were different times with different parameters does not wash. The main difference from a Chinese viewpoint was that, whereas then the Western powers and Japan were extremely strong and China was extremely weak, today, the Western powers, the US in particular, remain strong while China is no longer weak. Thus, in seeking to draw inspiration from the methods and achievements of great powers rising, what models are there other than the Western and Japanese imperialist nations? There is no precedent for peaceful rise.

This should not, of course, imply that while previous great powers looted and engaged in outrageous brutality, it is now “China’s turn”. But it strongly suggests that serious and honest reflection is called for, not only on the part of the Japanese, but also on the part of the other great powers, and on that basis to engage in genuine dialogue – not sermons – with China. Instead of getting on their moral high horses, sermonising from the alleged position of liberal values, far more constructive would be to admit – and eventually apologise – that in fact they behaved often abominably, feeling bound by no rules except that might is right.

This would seem the only viable means to engage China in its rise to great power, to contribute constructively to the unprecedented peaceful rise, and thereby to have some hope that peace may reign. Finally, after centuries of warfare, one could hope that great power bellicose rivalry might be relegated to the dustbin of history.

Jean-Pierre Lehmann is emeritus professor at IMD, founder of The Evian Group, and visiting professor at the University of Hong Kong


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脫貧路漫長 高教縮差距

信報財經新聞
教育講論
2017-03-11

何偉倫

究竟,貧窮是什麼呢?如果要推本溯源,引發貧窮問題似乎是由一系列錯綜複雜的因素導致。顯而易見,絕對不會是三言兩語可以交代清楚。所謂的脫貧則是一條漫長道路,教育彷彿是其中一個最有影響力的途徑,讓莘莘學子能夠有向上流動的機會。然而,坊間卻出現發人省思的問題──香港教育制度是否依然能夠作為向上流動的階梯呢?

近年,我們不難發現當今的年輕群組成長後,好像較上一兩個世代的年輕人更憤世嫉俗。作為一個新生代的一分子,積極參與社會及政治活動,以及表達對社會制度的不滿,似乎是無可厚非的。尤其是我們明白到青少年終究會對本港社會穩定性和政治發展的道路上,發揮中流砥柱的作用。然而,值得一提的問題是,近年年輕人起了的變化並非單單是本地問題。觀乎鄰近地區,即使我們曾經發生過佔領事件,在權衡輕重之間,刻下年輕人的反動意識似乎仍然算是相當克制。為什麼年輕人會反動呢?如果他們對自己的將來有一定的願景,又會否有截然不同的趨向呢?有為數不少的研究指出,資本及勞力是政經社發展的重要因素。只是,政經社的發展過程中有一些因素必須由下而上作出推動才能夠取得成就,教育則是當中的佼佼者。無可否認,教育投資能夠大幅度地改善人力質素,對經濟發展有着正向的影響。

在眾多的教育環節中,尤其以大學教育對一個人成年後經濟地位的改變,所產生的正面能量最為明顯及受到重視。接受大學教育對一個人未來的身價影響很大,只是要想提高自己的經濟地位其實非常困難。然而,倘若能夠考上大學,則個人的身價便可以提高,而且其牽引出來的可能性就可以倍加。

早年,香港教育大學的一項研究發現香港的大學學額即使已經持續增加,只是貧苦家庭子女接受大學教育的機會,反而相對於富裕家庭的子女,更有明顯差距。不堪的是,差幅似乎日益擴大。

一直以來,我們都深信教育是改善階層流動的最有效途徑,只是因為各種不同的因素導致教育未能真正地發揮應有的脫貧功用。值得留意的是,隨着近年學歷貶值愈趨嚴重,社會上已經出現了一些聲音,他們開始質疑到底教育是製造貧窮還是解決貧窮。尤其是近年的社會研究均指出,完成一個學位課程的回報率,似乎及不上早一點投身社會的影響……

成立於1916年,總部位於華盛頓特區智庫布魯金斯研究所(Brookings Institution)是華盛頓學術界的主流思想庫之一,他們曾經就教育是否能夠改變美國貧窮家庭的政經地位進行《向前還是落後:在美國改變人生的機會》(Getting Ahead or Losing Ground: Mobility in America)的研究。研究結果發現,貧窮家庭子女的政經地位沒有顯著的改變,其研究結果與剛才提到的香港教育大學的結論頗具類近性;原來海外社區都出現了富裕家庭子女在接受高等教育方面的機會及選擇權,相對於貧窮家庭存在愈來愈大的差距。

高樓價怨氣

其實年輕人對求學充滿熱忱是一個值得慶幸的事情, 只是高等教育學額數目的增長,似乎未能及時追上高等教育學額的需求,再加上不同的社會問題,諸如樓價高企令年輕人走上街頭抗爭。比方說,以往面對樓價的飛升,年輕人或許只有「買不起就算了」的心態。可惜的是,單純以樓價的瘋狂發展而言,已經不只「買不起」,而是「租也租不到」,因而怨氣日深。

部分年輕人甚至情願長期「炒散」,也不希望找到一份收入穩定、有晉升機會的工作,因為他們情願保持低薪一族的身份,以便留在輪候公屋的名單之上。筆者曾經在一個研究工作的訪談部分中,認識一位畢業於專業範疇的空中服務員,他情願每個月替更三數次,也不願意投入全職部隊。最為令人咋舌的是,這位空中服務員的家人及朋友也認同和理解這樣的決定。

我們當然不可能歸咎於政府政策,因為樓價飛升某程度和全球性的經濟發展有着不可分割的關係。只是,雖然政府無法扭轉這種令人透不過氣的社經轉型趨勢,又是否可以檢討一下現行的制度及政策,務求以人為本和訂定明確的規劃,以回應年輕人對未來不穩性的不安感呢?

試想像,當政府願意在年輕人修畢高等教育課程的一定年期後,願意把一定份額的學費回撥予他們作為置業基金,將會是一個多麼振奮人心的動力。再者,為針對年輕族群的散漫心態,以及鼓勵他們盡早投入社會服務,不至於浪費從學術旅程中所汲取的知識及技能,政府當局亦可考慮一些鼓勵性的措施,諸如當年輕人在投身社會後所需要繳交的薪俸稅愈多,政府部門則回撥更高百分比的金額,用以鼓勵年輕人更積極的投身社會,相信很大程度上能夠改變年輕人對未來出路的消極態度。

然而,政府在實施此等措施之前,也必須顧及部分弱勢族群。比方說,大部申請專上課程學費補助減免及貸款的申請人皆來自弱勢社群,他們在過去所得到的教育資源,以至文化培養,已被富裕家庭比下去,在學術上的能力及適應性也有一定的差距,因為不同原因休學、退學的人數明顯較多。相對於部分學子在中途休學後,能夠在父幹的影響下即時投身其他課程,較為處於弱勢的群組則需要先解決如何退回補助……

由此可見,脫貧路漫長,高等教育的機會固然可以縮減差距;只是真締還是在於一個完善的全方位補助方案。

撰文:何偉倫
香港高等教育科技學院語文及通識教育學院特任導師、新力量網絡研究員


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Having a helper leaves Hong Kong’s young lazy and spoilt

South China Morning Post
CommentInsight & Opinion
2017-07-04

Peter Kammerer

Peter Kammerer says depending on helpers for daily living well into adulthood renders Hongkongers averse to hardship, unable to think for themselves and lacking basic life skills

The 20th anniversary of Hong Kong’s return to China raised all sorts of issues, among them whether our city has lost its edge. The conclusion seems to be yes – that we’re gradually falling behind competitors in virtually every area.

There was even a suggestion that our famed entrepreneurial spirit was disappearing, and questions were asked as to why. It’s a complicated subject with rent, education and parental ambitions for children at play, but I’d also wager that part of the problem is because we have too many maids.

Foreign domestic helpers aren’t to blame for the decline of shipping, universities slipping down rankings and Shenzhen lording it over us with innovations and hi-tech industries.

But my argument is less about advantage than laziness. Rather than coming up with solutions to our problems, we’re increasingly expecting others to fix them for us. Younger generations, like the millennials, appear to want everything laid out for them, from cheap housing to the best jobs – all for minimal effort.

It’s easy to see why people aged between 18 and their mid-30s would think this way; many had or continue to have maids to take care of them.

Between the end of 1998 and 2015, the year for the latest statistics, the number of foreign domestic helpers almost doubled – from 180,000 to 340,380.

That’s a lot of youngsters who didn’t need to clean up after themselves, had someone cooking for them, getting them ready for and perhaps taking them to school, and to be on hand to cater for their every need.

They were spoilt as kids and many continue that way as adults.

I know of single people who have full-time maids to take care of them and their pets. A couple with a pre-teen son have decided to move back into the wife’s parents’ home while their helper is on vacation because the thought of taking care of the child, cleaning the flat and cooking is too daunting.

Those raised by maids are readily identifiable at the gym I go to; they ignore rules to return used towels to the front counter and instead drop them on the changing room floor.

In the weights area, heavy plates are left either on the floor or attached to bars, rather than being put back in racks, posing a danger to other users. The toilets are left in a mess.

Helpers are an integral part of the Hong Kong government’s growth strategy. They enable both parents to work and provide care for children and the elderly. As a result, their wages are kept artificially low and exempt from minimum wage requirements.

With the typical Hongkonger earning about HK$15,800 a month, many working couples can easily afford the HK$4,310 salary.

But the influx of maids, at present increasing annually by about 10,000, has a litany of drawbacks.

The government is not under pressure to expand or improve child and elderly care services. Helpers may not be adequately trained to take care of a wheelchair-bound or bedridden person.

Sundays are a popular day for employers to give their maids their weekly day off, which means public places are overcrowded. And then, there is the reliance of families on their helpers to the point that they no longer have basic life skills.

Lazy people don’t necessarily have lazy minds; studies have found they’re often the intelligent ones and have figured how to get by with minimal effort.

But avoiding hard work and expecting something for nothing doesn’t teach us important lessons like success and failure, and finding solutions to problems.

Helpers free us up from what some people would consider the mundane, but the extra time is only worthwhile if put to constructive use.

Judging by our flat economic growth, reluctance to break away from businesses that are fading, and jump on opportunities offered by the Hong Kong and Beijing governments and take a risk, we’re well on the way to losing the ability to think for ourselves.

Peter Kammerer is a senior writer at the Post


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The Asian financial crisis teaches the need for bold reform, but is China listening?

South China Morning Post
Comment›Insight & Opinion
2017-07-03

William Pesek

William Pesek says regional economies that appear to have recovered from the crash are struggling with structural problems and stagnating incomes, as policymakers baulk at needed reforms. Beijing, now facing similar risks, should take note

My favourite Asian crisis story involves Robert Rubin, an elevator and a pile of cash.

It was September 1997, and I’d just exchanged US dollars in our Jakarta hotel lobby. I was taken aback, and vaguely embarrassed, by the huge stack of rupiah I received – all with colourful money wrappers. In the elevator, I ran into then US Treasury secretary Rubin and one of his top lieutenants, Timothy Geithner. I was among a handful of Washington journalists accompanying them around Asia. Rubin looked at my loot and deadpanned: “I see you found time for a drug deal.”

That was 2½ months after Bangkok’s July 2, 1997 devaluation set Asia’s reckoning in motion. The good news, 20 years on, is that the Thai, Indonesian and South Korean currencies recovered and reserves were restocked. Banking systems were strengthened and economies made more transparent. Capital accounts were loosened and market regulation tightened. Wages bounced back, too. The bad news: income gains have largely stalled in recent years. Is the real legacy of that regional crisis a regional middle-income trap?

That’s when per capita income tops out at, or below, the US$10,000 mark, as it has for Thailand (about US$6,000), Indonesia (US$4,000) and even economies that technically avoided the worst of the crisis – including Malaysia and, perhaps, the Philippines. And while South Korea is the top of the income class – and a proud escapee of the middle-income category – it’s since been ensnared in a higher-income net.

What went wrong? In the immediate years after 1997, technocrats in Thailand, Indonesia and Korea implemented the International Monetary Fund’s reform playbook to modernise financial systems. Strong US demand did the rest, enabling Bangkok, Jakarta and Seoul to export their way back to 5 per-cent-plus growth. But the return of rapid gross domestic product growth deadened the urgency to do the real heavy lifting; weaning economies off exports; building credible institutions; increasing productivity and innovation; diversifying trade links; eradicating corruption; devising better energy strategies; and separating the public and private sectors.

Blame the “Cult of GDP”, something to which Asian leaders have long been susceptible. When heady growth returns, policymakers declare victory, pop the champagne corks and shelve painful upgrades. In the two decades since 1997, Asia’s crisis victims revelled in buoyant equity markets, claimed economies had decoupled from the West and toasted the tidal wave of bankers abandoning New York and London and relocating to Hong Kong and Singapore. And besides, China’s boom would keep the good times going. The cost of leaders believing their own press was slower wage gains. Asia is learning the hard way that “boosterism” is no replacement for economic retooling.

A large painting depicting the late Thai King, Bhumibol Adulyadej, is seen outside the Bangkok Art and Culture Centre last month. Thailand has experienced two coups as a succession of leaders failed to spread the benefits of growth. Photo: EPA
A large painting depicting the late Thai King, Bhumibol Adulyadej, is seen outside the Bangkok Art and Culture Centre last month. Thailand has experienced two coups as a succession of leaders failed to spread the benefits of growth. Photo: EPA

Thailand has experienced two coups as a succession of leaders failed to spread the benefits of growth and get the state out of the financial system (it has been in the hands of a military junta since May 2014). Indonesian incomes are stagnating as reform fatigue and parochial squabbles – over everything from access to natural resources to openness to foreign trade and religion – distract Jakarta. Progress stalled in Malaysia as scandal-plagued Prime Minister Najib Razak clings to affirmative-action policies benefiting ethnic Malays at the expense of competitiveness. In the Philippines, too, Rodrigo Duterte is putting a bloody war against drug pushers and users ahead of raising Manila’s economic game.

Korea beat the middle-income trap, but it’s now ensnared in a higher-income funk. Seoul’s failure to reduce the role of the family-owned conglomerates towering over all corners of the economy and catalyse a start-up boom has average incomes stuck near US$27,000.

Similar criticism could be hurled at Hong Kong, as it commemorates the 20th anniversary of its return to China. While per capita income is 11 times Indonesia’s, Hong Kong hasn’t expanded its growth engines beyond finance and overpriced property. The cost: exploding inequality that’s delegitimising the city’s Beijing-picked leadership and feeding combustible social tensions.

Bold structural changes are always easier when crashing currencies leave leaders no choice. Unless Asian governments relocate some of that 1997 urgency, they will rely more on debt to fuel growth than entrepreneurship and higher productivity. Little good would come of that. That’s Thailand’s big challenge as Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha tries to find his reformist mojo. It’s Joko Widodo’s problem in Jakarta as he struggles to take on vested interests working to regain power over the government. It’s also President Moon Jae-in [4]’s task in Seoul as he deals with a fresh bubble in household debt and rampant corruption.

And what of China? Few questions matter more than whether mainland incomes can reach US$10,000, and beyond. Never before has global stability been so dependent on such an opaque, unbalanced and developing economy. China “definitely has the potential to further catch up with the high-income countries and avoid [getting trapped]”, write Asian Development Bank economists Linda Glawe and Helmut Wagner. “However, the future performance of China’s economy depends on further reforms.” Those changes include altering a debt structure not unlike that of Thailand and other Asian governments, circa 1997.

For most, Asia’s collapse was just as unexpected as Wall Street’s 11 years later. China’s growth engines, it’s worth noting, are tantalisingly familiar: explosions in debt, credit and unproductive investments; chronic overcapacity; quantity of growth trumping quality; a sprawling shadow-banking machine; surging non-performing-loan ratios; policymakers drawing down currency reserves; regulators prodding domestic companies to go public before their time; and complacency among markets about how fast things could go awry. Beijing is treating the symptoms of its excess, not the root causes, in ways that are feeding ever-bigger bubbles. What’s more, US President Donald Trump’s threatened trade war is an ever-present threat to Asia.

Beijing, in other words, must do better than the class of 1997 in learning from past mistakes and preparing for future prosperity. Economic reform, remember, has something in common with the elevator in which I bumped into Rubin 20 years ago: it has the power to lift populations to new heights or leave them on the ground floor. Asia must work harder to ensure incomes regain an upward trajectory.

William Pesek is a Tokyo-based journalist and the author of Japanization: What the World Can Learn from Japan’s Lost Decades.


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從刻舟求劍到逆水行舟

明報
觀點
2017-07-03
馬嶽:

 

2017年6月,香港人被各種「回歸20年」的討論和回顧淹沒。我個人對這種年結式/十年結式的「回顧」一直興趣不大。我總覺得年月是時間的單位,從社會科學的角度,和社會變遷沒有因果關係,於是20年不見得比19年或21年更值得反省回顧,12月也不應比11月更有回顧價值。很多社會變遷都是持續性的,用「齊頭」的數字作結不見得是最好的框架。用文件或文字來規定社會在某段時間的變遷,像「50年不變」,本身就是不科學的。

多年來最重要的變遷是什麼?

這篇文章的截稿恰好定在6月30日,好像是某種命定要寫點和「回歸20年」有關的東西。這段日子給人問了很多相關問題,令我不禁想:這許多年來最重要的變遷是什麼?

一直以來,一國兩制的最深層次矛盾,是中港在政治價值上的差距,或者說是中國共產黨領導和港人主流在政治價值上的差距。我會問:二三十年來,這差距拉近了麼?

一國兩制基本構想上着眼的「兩制」差異,最初當然是經濟性的(「兩制」是社會主義和資本主義)。中國內地和香港最大的差異在經濟制度、生產力、發展水平和生活水平上,而原有法制、司法獨立和法治、各種人權和自由,是香港經濟制度重要的政治配件。在一國兩制原構想下,這些政治價值和制度上的差異,都可以在民族主義(「一國」)的大前提下包容。

「50年不變」的假設是,香港的生產力和制度都較先進,但假以時日中國內地在經濟發展、生產力和生活水平會追近香港,差異會因而拉近,可能50年後不需要再一國兩制。這個分析方法,當然是「很馬克思主義式」的。

網絡社會來臨和新身分政治興起

但人類是很難預測社會的長遠變化的。近二三十年世界社會的最大變化之一,用Castells的說法,是網絡社會的來臨和新的身分政治的興起。經濟變遷如後工業化、全球化和網絡力量,加上冷戰結束,令世界各地人民找尋新的身分,令民族國家(nation-state)的影響力下降、人民追求自主自由參與、抵抗父權,各種身分政治的運動應運而生(包括環保、性小眾、各種地域自主的運動等,當然也有向宗教原教旨主義和排外族群主義進發的)。

香港人尤其年輕一代緊貼全球化的趨勢,隨着踏進後現代和網絡社會,走向崇尚自由、自治、自主、後物質主義和平等價值,思考新的身分認同,認同各種後現代的運動,是自然不過的事。

世上不少先進國家面對網絡社會和新身分運動的挑戰,走向權力下放、尊重及回應地方自治的訴求、領導層年輕化、快速回應民意、加強施政的問責性;對各種後現代的運動訴求,例如環保和同性婚姻,也要加倍重視和積極回應。

但我們看中國官員對香港的話語和其盛載的價值,到了2017年卻仍然非常「前現代」。例如經常仍然用冷戰思維看問題:反抗運動都是「西方亡我之心不死」的結果。例如香港年輕人的問題是經濟問題、是不能上流和買房子的問題,對策是給更多經濟援助;「人心不回歸」就加強由上而下的教育,再多加些課時或者從幼稚園開始,例如強調國族主義和民族國家的必要,希望不斷強化國家功能來控制公民社會和民間自主。衡量一國兩制成功的標準永遠是「繁榮」和「安定」,永遠是經濟增長、建設和競爭力,不去問生活在其中的港人是否覺得自由快樂。面對政制民主化的要求,就祭出「國家安全」和「穩定」的大旗。回歸廿年滿街紅旗水馬,滿紙像是工業化初始階段的話語和口號,和香港近年的政治價值走向背道而馳,差距像不止一個世代,真的是「恍如隔世」。

二三十年前,中國政府還會比較虛心地承認香港問題他們不大懂,香港有很多先進的制度特質中國內地需要學習(例如法治、科學管理方法、公務員制度、廉政等等),於是《基本法》會加進不少制度限制,為防止內地影響香港建立一些「防火牆」。今天的中國自居「天朝」,信心滿滿地覺得「中國模式」可以垂範天下,變成了張浚生來教導香港人什麼叫法治、你們不懂管治香港我們來教你。這變成把「中國模式」看成最普遍優越的制度,覺得遠在「天朝國都」的人比香港人更了解香港管治,也不見得有什麼知識根據了。

20年「舟已行矣而劍不行」

10多年前,我就用過《呂氏春秋》中的「刻舟求劍」比喻來說香港的政治發展:「楚人有涉江者,其劍自舟中墜於水,遽契其舟曰:『是吾劍之所從墜也。』舟止,從其所契者入水求之。舟已行矣,而劍不行, 求劍若此,不亦惑乎?以故法為其國與此同。時已徙矣,而法不徙,以此為治,豈不難哉?」

這本來說的是,如果政治價值已經大變,但政制十多廿年都不變,是沒有能力回應新一代的政治訴求的。二三十年前,香港人還可以接受「安定繁榮」的話語,因為當年政治文化還很保守,殖民地的不民主體制邏輯八九十年代勉強還是可以管治的。20年都沒有與時並進,改革政制來跟上人民價值的轉變,就是「舟已行矣,而劍不行」了。

中國官員連與時並進的欲望也沒有

在2017年的今天看來,這個看法竟然還是太樂觀了。劍墜在水底,通常是不會動的。中港的政治價值鴻溝,卻可能是愈來愈闊。二三十年來中國內地的生產力和發展水平當然是大大追上香港,但政治價值差異卻沒有隨之拉近。當香港人的政治價值已經急速地隨着全球化和進入網絡世代而邁進後現代、後物質和新身分政治,中國官員仍然用一大堆工業化初始的概念看世界看香港,不單政治觀念沒有現代化,連與時並進的欲望也沒有了。河底有暗流,劍好像愈來愈遠了。

延伸閱讀:Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity(West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010)