Generation 40s – 四十世代

Good articles for buddies

Leave a comment

Is China planning to take Taiwan by force in 2020?

CommentInsight & Opinion

Deng Yuwen believes Beijing is coming to the conclusion that if it is to achieve reunification with Taiwan, as Xi Jinping has pledged to do at the 19th party congress, it has to do so by force, and sooner rather than later

Does Beijing have a timetable for seizing control of Taiwan? This has been a hot topic for the media and among experts on cross-strait relations. I believe such a timetable exists. If the timeline was rather vague in the past, it has become clearer now. And the US security strategy that President Donald Trump recently unveiled will hasten the pace of Beijing’s plan to take back the island, probably in 2020.

President Xi Jinping’s report at the 19th Communist Party congress offers some clues. In the address, he identified “one country, two systems” and the reunification of the motherland as a fundamental strategy of a “new era” for China. This provides a clue to Beijing’s timeline for resolving the Taiwan problem.

According to the report, the new era refers to a period from now until the middle of this century. By 2050, China is to achieve the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and become a modern socialist power.

A list of 14 items describe this new era, and one of them involves reunification with Taiwan. This means Beijing must take control of Taiwan by 2050 at the latest.

Plainly, as long as Taiwan remains outside the Chinese fold, the “great rejuvenation” of the Chinese nation cannot happen.

No surprise, then, to hear Xi say that Beijing would never allow “any individual, any organisation, any political party, at any time or by any means, to split any single piece of the Chinese territory”.

Last month, a Chinese diplomat’s fighting words over the idea of the US sending navy ships to Taiwan were also revealing. Li Kexin, a minister at the Chinese embassy in Washington, warned that port-of-call exchanges between the US and Taiwan would not be tolerated.

“The day a US Navy vessel arrives in Kaohsiung is the day that our People’s Liberation Army unifies Taiwan with military force,” he told mainland media.

While it is unlikely the PLA would really start a war over a US Navy visit to Taiwan, the words reflect a consistent belief of Chinese leaders: that Taiwan has to be taken back by force.

Since Xi came to power, the party has been open about its wish for the PLA to be battle-ready. No doubt the army’s first target would be Taiwan.

Also, Xi’s sense of calling would never allow him to tolerate Taiwan’s indefinite separation from the mainland. Whatever one may think of Xi, most people would agree that he is driven by a strong sense of national pride.

That is why, as soon as he came to power, he launched the “Chinese dream” campaign and set out the goal of achieving national rejuvenation. In the party congress address, he painted a picture of the new era that reflected his thinking and linguistic style.

As a leader who is bent on raising China’s global stature to a level that rivals the nation’s glory years in Han and Tang times, Xi would surely not tolerate an indefinite split between Taiwan and the mainland.

Nonetheless, the points raised so far only signal that Beijing has a timetable in mind to unify Taiwan with China, but they do not explain why the PLA could move to take Taiwan by force in 2020.

A combination of factors could point to a military confrontation.

They include Trump’s labelling of China as a strategic rival in his administration’s national security strategy; Beijing’s worry about the pro-independence movement in Taiwan and its belief that it now has the ability to resolve the Taiwan problem once and for all; a misjudgment by Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen; and Xi’s sense of his own legacy.

First of all, why would Beijing opt for unification by force, rather than through the peaceful negotiation it has always championed? There are four reasons. First, after extending economic help to the island for years, Beijing has still failed to win the hearts and minds of its people. Instead, cross-strait relations have deteriorated.

Second, as one generation of Taiwanese replaces another, the “Chinese” identity among the people will only grow weaker.

Third, the influence of Taiwan’s political parties is waning. Even if the Kuomintang wins back power, it would not be in a position to lead cross-strait unification.

Fourth, more and more Chinese are calling for unification by force.

Thus, though on the surface Beijing has continued to call for a peaceful reunification, it has in fact ditched the idea.

As Beijing believes it has to use force to reunite with Taiwan, the next step would be to find a good time to do so. The year 2020 offers such an opportunity.

That’s the year when China would be approaching the first of its “two centenary” goals – the establishment of a xiaokang, or moderately prosperous, society by 2021, the 100th year of the founding of the Communist Party.

This would act as a driving force for China to take back Taiwan by force. If China becomes a well-off nation with Taiwan in its fold, it would mean a historic achievement for Xi.

Next, Trump’s national security strategy not only labels China and Russia as America’s “strategic rivals”, it also pledges to maintain strong ties with Taiwan. This will quicken Beijing’s plans to take back Taiwan by force.

In reality, China and the US are, of course, strategic rivals. But by stating it in its security strategy, the US indicates a shift in its long-term policy on China, letting it be known that it would seek to contain China rather than work with it. This would lead Beijing to conclude that it should resolve the Taiwan problem sooner rather than later.

Is the PLA ready for such a battle? In a recent interview, China analyst Ian Easton said he believed the Chinese military would not be ready for an attack in 2020 because of the slow pace of military reform. However, many Chinese analysts would not agree with that view.

At the 19th party congress last October, Xi pledged a major upgrade in mechanisation and the communications systems in the armed forces by 2020, which would greatly enhance the country’s strategic capabilities.

By 2035, he said, China would have completely modernised its defence forces; by the middle of the century, it would become a world-class military force.

The military has come a long way since reforms were launched four years ago. And fighting a war would be the best way to gauge its improvements.

In today’s China, more and more people are advocating the use of force to unify Taiwan with the mainland.

A series of military drills focused on Taiwan in recent days has also raised speculation that the mainland is preparing itself for a military invasion. It is likely that such “encirclement patrols” might become routine.

All is set for Beijing to unify with Taiwan by force, except for one thing – a pretext or a reason to take action. Emboldened by US support, the Taiwanese government that Tsai leads may well test China’s bottom line by further cementing its ties with America, such as with the proposed exchanges between US and Taiwanese navies.

Finally, whether Beijing decides to mobilise against Taiwan in 2020 will still depend on the decision of its leaders.

Xi may be tempted to secure the historic achievement of reunification as part of his legacy. Furthermore, if war breaks out, the peacetime systems and procedures will have to be set aside.

This will allow Xi to stay in power beyond his expected retirement in 2022, to give him more time to work on realising the Chinese dream of rejuvenation.

If Beijing takes up arms against Taiwan in 2020, there will be formidable changes for East Asia and the world. North Korea may also risk waging war on South Korea, if its nuclear capabilities are not eradicated earlier.

I do not want to see war breaking out. For this reason, we must pay more attention to what happens in 2020.

Deng Yuwen is a researcher at the Charhar Institute think tank. This article is translated from Chinese


Leave a comment

Four challenges ‘Greater Bay Area’ planners must overcome to ensure success

CommentInsight & Opinion

Feng Da Hsuan and Liang Hai Ming highlight some issues for planners to consider for the Greater Bay Area, including how to tackle the complexities of the massive project, attract talent and prevent a brain drain in smaller cities, and ensure a safety net for failure

The release of a “Greater Bay Area” development plan for linking Hong Kong and Macau with nine cities in Guangdong province is expected to be released early this year. The plan may be a sign of China’s ascent, but this area will be starkly different from, for example, the San Francisco, New York and Tokyo bay areas. While it is all within one nation, it also links two “systems”, three currencies and multiple cities. This makes the plan highly convoluted, and such complexity could pose far more challenges than those found in other bay areas.

Here are four potential issues. First, because the Greater Bay Area consists of cities in Guangdong province, plus Hong Kong and Macau, any kind of amalgamation will be one of multiplicities, rather than natural affinities, and this could mean additional obstacles to the flow of talent, finance, logistics, information and so on.

It has been suggested that the euro-zone experience could provide a good lesson where, to coordinate nations of vast differences as seamlessly as possible, it was necessary to jointly organise and empower a “coordination team” to overcome the difficulties. Indeed, having such a team, at least in principle, should lead to greater affinities. This is why a single currency, the euro, and a single political system known as the European Parliament were established.

One obvious difficulty that the euro zone faced is that the economically weaker nations within it, such as Greece and Portugal, raised their debt levels greatly while under the euro-zone protection umbrella. The actions of these nations resulted in a series of debt crises which led to doubts about the sustainability of the euro zone, roiling financial markets, including those outside Europe. The European debt crisis and Brexit, plus the drama of potential exits by Greece and the Netherlands, have been directly or indirectly due to such actions.

These nations have chosen to leave, or have considered leaving, the euro zone so they can individually decide on exchange rates in order to increase exports and promote economic development. How to overcome or prevent the same fate in the Greater Bay Area is something that needs to be addressed upfront.

Also, the Greater Bay Area may not be able to attract talent within China and worldwide for sustainable development. It will take much more than just money and new projects to make the area a global centre of technological innovation, advanced manufacturing and maritime, finance and trade; what is needed is talent across the board and a global mindset.

There are two main issues to address in this respect. The first is to understand that the vision and ideas of foreign talent, especially people from Europe and North America, are quite different from those in China. Besides requiring high-paying jobs, comfortable living conditions and a pleasant working environment, these people also want a clear project mission, a step-by-step plan and well-designed project funding.

Unfortunately, this is the opposite of how Chinese operate. Generally speaking, while Chinese may have an initial grand vision, they tend to “plan along the way” rather than long-term and without already designated funds. The leadership of this grand development scheme will need great wisdom to bridge the gap.

Second, in euro-zone nations, due to workers’ low wages in the “have-not” nations, talent and indigenous finance tend to flow naturally toward the “haves”, causing a downward spiral for the others, making them even poorer. A similar situation may occur in the Greater Bay Area, where talent in cities outside Guangzhou, Hong Kong and Macau could flow towards those three. This could force such cities to institute favourable policies to retain indigenous talent, which could widen the gap between rich and poor in those cities, resulting in social instability.

The Greater Bay Area could also affect the surrounding regions. Developing the bay area could have a beneficial effect on surrounding, less-developed areas. However, an undesirable “echo effect” may occur; that is, production in those areas could flow back into the Greater Bay Area because of the emphasis on its development, causing the surrounding regions to suffer a loss of resources and production.

Finally, to become a truly successful world-class technological region, there must be a safety net for failure.

Across the world, whether in science, technology or entrepreneurship, failure is the norm and success the exception. If a region allows innovators to fail without a safety net to allow them to rebound, it will not only destroy innovation but also the innovative spirit. This safety net could be in the form of the protection of company dissolution, bank arrears as well as tax burdens. In the United States, San Diego is a successful biotech innovation centre, and one reason for its success is its robust safety net.

It is also important to underscore that the Greater Bay Area will not be the sole new innovation centre in China. Without a safety net, those who want to and are able to rebound may be attracted to other centres. It must be remembered that failure is not forever. After all, innovators who are willing to try again probably have enough energy, creativity and wisdom to succeed in the future.

It is our earnest hope that the Greater Bay Area development plan will address some or all of the challenges mentioned here.

We firmly believe that the designers have the wisdom, experience and vision to create a successful Greater Bay Area with Chinese characteristics, and propel it into the ranks of world-class bay areas internationally.

Feng Da Hsuan is senior adviser of the China Silk Road iValley Research Institute. Liang Hai Ming is chairman and chief economist of the institute

Leave a comment







《南華早報》配合中國近年的崛起,其使命是「引領全球關於中國的對話」。它正努力改革,首先是在體制文化上把編輯部全面數字(數碼)化。其次是在結構上將製作傳統報紙的人手縮減至編輯部全體員工的一成,而且將紙媒的重點放在提供獨家原創新聞和深度報道。第三是在技術上成立了數據分析部門,幫助了解讀者流量和熱門話題、優化工作決策,及尋找更有效的文章標題,以提升搜索引擎中的排名。最後是在內容上着重多媒體及互動性,從文字和圖片邁向社交媒體、facebook live、虛擬現實等內容。



個案之二是台灣的《聯合報》。其「內容長」(chief content officer)柔美月表示,該報的方向是強化數位戰力及擴大品牌價值。他們在2008年提出「雙引擎策略」,包括「數位回流」和「多元營收」,希望用多元事業經營來支持媒體的永續發展。「數位回流」是指不同部門互相協作,其中包括影音、行動服務、數據發展、詮釋數位及新媒體中心。而「多元營收」的單位包括聯合數位文創、健康、教育、娛樂生活、「udn買東西」。









全面數碼 跨越報業





Leave a comment

How China is leading the ‘new retail’ revolution

CommentInsight & Opinion

Edward Tse and Jackie Wang say market moves by Chinese firms like Alibaba, Tencent and show how key players are experimenting with various forms of tech-driven ‘new retail’ in the O2O world, making the industry more dynamic than ever

While the past two years may have been brutal for brick-and-mortar stores worldwide, China’s online and offline retailers have witnessed a “new retail” revolution, driving an increasingly stronger national consumption.

Since China launched economic reforms in 1978, the country’s retail industry has undergone multiple stages of development.

With foreign retailers flooding in after China joined the World Trade Organisation in 2001, the scene was diversified. Offline retail started to be challenged by Taobao, Alibaba’s online shopping platform, which was founded in 2003 and grew ­exponentially in the following decade. The transaction amount for Alibaba’s “Singles’ Day” 24-hour online sales each November 11 has grown from 50 million yuan (HK$59 million) in 2009 to 168 billion yuan this year.

With e-commerce booming, businesses have been adopting an “online to offline” (O2O) model, using online channels to attract offline traffic. In the past few years, this phenomenon has evolved into the notion of “new retail”.

New retail represents a trend of online merging seamlessly with offline, resulting from the prevalence of digital technology, like mobile payment, wireless internet, sensors and artificial intelligence (AI).

In this model, online is no longer just a sales channel, but provides ubiquitous touchpoints to interact with consumers and their social groups. By contrast, offline retailers are trying hard to keep consumers in their brick-and-mortar stores for longer, offering better customer experiences by leveraging digital technologies.

From sales and marketing to ­logistics and inventory management, the new retail revolution is transforming the industry. For example, Amazon Go, the pioneer in new retail in the US, tracks purchasing behaviour with sensors placed on supermarket shelves. After consumers choose their products, they can just walk out of the store, with the amount payable automatically deducted from their mobile payment account.

Some aspects of the retail operation are also becoming less human-led. In China, logistics firm Cainiao is incorporating hi-tech-enabled hardware and software to improve efficiency. In its logistics park, ­Cainiao deploys drones to monitor the security of the venue. Within the warehouse, several robots called “Geek+” work with staff to sort packages. It also uses computer vision to identify, monitor and ­arrange different orders.

Improved logistics efficiency is contributing to the consumer experience as well. Consumers will not only receive their packages faster, but also with fewer errors and get fresher goods.

Whereas in America, Amazon is at the forefront of the new retail revolution, China’s speed and intensity have gone into orbit. Players big and small are experimenting with various forms of new retail, making the industry more dynamic than ever.

Driven by the huge market ­opportunities and abundant venture capital, start-ups in China are actively participating in this revolution. For example, Xingbianli, a convenience store and vending machine start-up, offers many popular Korean and Japanese products that could mostly only be bought via daigou (individuals who shop overseas and resell to Chinese consumers). More importantly, it is testing the area of unmanned retail.

Products have their own bar code, which can be scanned by consumers when they choose their shopping and then check out on the Xingbianli app. There is also a mini-library and a ­café within the convenience store, aimed at making consumers linger.

Traditional local retailers are also incubating their own new retail formats, such as Super Species, a subsidiary of China’s largest supermarket chain, Yonghui Superstores.

Super Species specialises in selling fresh produce, such as vegetables and seafood, and combines the traditional market with restaurants, ­cafés, florists, and so on. It has also introduced a Yonghui Partnership Plan, allowing staff to present more innovative retail ideas and pilot them within the stores. Super Species itself is becoming an incubator for those innovative ideas, and new retail here is no longer just about changing the store format, but also the mindsets of all staff.

Tech giants like Alibaba, Tencent and are heavily investing and competing head to head in the offline battleground. Alibaba ­invested US$2.9 billion in one of China’s largest supermarket chains, Sun Art Retail Group, in November. It aims to transform Sun Art’s offline business of over 400 ­Auchan and RT-Mart branded ­hypermarkets and provides technology to enhance customer data and inventory management.

In 2015, invested US$700 million in Yonghui Superstores. This month, Tencent, a close ally of, acquired a 5 per cent share in Super Species, and made capital injection for a 15 per cent stake in Yonghui Yunchuang Technology, Yonghui’s supply chain and logistics subsidiary.

To further compete with Alibaba online and enrich their own ecosystems, Tencent and are ­investing in, a Chinese e-commerce platform specialising in discounted products for women.

They will together own 12.5 per cent of and, as they further monetise their traffic, the new retail battle with Alibaba will ­get fiercer.

Foreign companies are also ­actively piloting their new retail strategy in China. Earlier this month, the world’s largest Starbucks ­Reserve Roastery opened in Shanghai, leveraging Alibaba’s technology to give consumers a more immersed Starbucks journey.

This is also the first mass offline application of augmented reality (AR) technology. Consumers can use the Taobao app to unlock the AR features in the store, such as learning about the details of the Starbucks coffee brewing process.

Technologies are enabling these companies to create new business approaches, while intense competition is driving all players to ­become better. They can’t afford to slow down. China’s scale also allows companies to use the market as a business laboratory and to experiment with business models.

Through fast launch and adaptation, players can fine-tune their business model at a rapid pace.

Beyond retail, the future consumption landscape will be much more complicated and sophisticated. Digital technologies, especially AI, 5G network and the internet of things, are already blurring the boundaries of industries.

Eventually, retail will be merely one layer of the consumer lifestyle, albeit a high-frequency one. The internet of things will create a new ecosystem that is ubiquitous and interconnected. Also, 5G network development will facilitate this process in the near future and bring about disruption in the retail world.

Assisted by machine learning and big data, consumers will ­increasingly be viewed as a “segment of one” and receive more personalised solutions, not just in ­retail, but in every facet of their life.

To that end, China will be at the global forefront of innovation and experimentation.

Edward Tse is founder & CEO of Gao Feng Advisory Company, a global strategy and management consulting firm with roots in Greater China. Jackie Wang is a senior consultant of the firm

Leave a comment

Hong Kong should waive the debt of disqualified lawmakers, following Australia’s example

CommentInsight & Opinion
Grenville Cross says the practice in Australia of not pursuing the debt of ejected parliamentarians – provided they have discharged their duties ‘in good faith’ – offers Hong Kong a way forward

Although the president of Hong Kong’s legislature, Andrew Leung Kwan-yuen, says the Legislative Council Commission acted on legal advice in seeking the full repayment of salaries and allowances from four disqualified lawmakers, the advice has been queried in some quarters.

The fact remains that the disqualification of Nathan Law Kwun-chung, Leung Kwok-hung, Lau Siu-lai and Edward Yiu Chung-yim meant that their original election was void. As such, they were disentitled to the sums paid, and the commission is within its rights in seeking their return, however imprudent that course may be.

But this is not its only course.

In October, several lawmakers in Australia, including the deputy prime minister Barnaby Joyce, also lost their seats. The Australian High Court decided they were ineligible because they were dual nationals, which is constitutionally prohibited. As the ejected lawmakers had already taken part in parliamentary proceedings for over a year, the repayment of salaries and entitlements would, if enforced, be a significant burden for them.

A similar situation also arose in April, when the High Court – for constitutional reasons unrelated to citizenship – found that Senator Bob Day had not been validly elected in 2016. Although the question of repayment arose, the responsible minister, Scott Ryan, said it would be unfair of the government to pursue the debt, given that Day had discharged his senatorial duties “in good faith”.

In Australia, the convention is to waive such debt. Ousted parliamentarians are given two options: pay up or apply for a waiver from the government. Provided there is no evidence of bad faith, the application of a waiver will normally be granted.

In Hong Kong, the four lawmakers seemingly acted in good faith in the Legislative Council after they were sworn in. Although they took their oaths in an irregular fashion, with two being required to retake them, they were all nonetheless ultimately seated. By contrast, the extreme antics of two other lawmakers, Sixtus Baggio Leung Chung-hang and Yau Wai-ching, at their oath-taking resulted in them being excluded altogether.

The four seated legislators would have assumed that they had been accepted as Legco members.

In these circumstances, the Australian approach provides valuable guidance for the Legco commission, which should now reconsider its demands in light of it. This, after all, was not a case in which someone tricked their way into Legco, as happened in 1985, when Tai Chin-wah, having falsely represented himself to be a solicitor, was elected to the chamber. He was unmasked six years later.

There can be no possible objection to the commission enforcing repayment of the debts owed by Sixtus Baggio Leung and Yau, whose abusive conduct violated basic norms. Their four colleagues, however, were not in that category, as the Legco president himself accepted. Ejection from Legco is itself a severe sanction, and basic fairness requires the waiver of the debts.

If, however, this does not happen, it is fanciful for people to suggest that Legco proceedings in which the four participated should be retroactively undone. Even if feasible, this would produce chaos.

In 1907, the Australian High Court resolved this very issue when it ruled that votes on legislation remain valid, even if a parliamentarian is subsequently deemed to have been invalidly elected, and this remains good law. As the judgment put it, “the proceedings of the Senate as a House of Parliament are not invalidated by the presence of a senator without title”.

Grenville Cross SC is a criminal justice analyst