Generation 40s – 四十世代

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愈年輕愈投本土/自決派一票

明報
筆陣
2017-05-11
蔡子強、陳雋文

上個星期(5月4日),通過整理選舉事務處公布的立法會選舉投票數據,點出近年年輕人投票行為模式的兩大重要特徵,分別是:

一、在雨傘運動之後,年輕人無論在區議會選舉或立法會選舉,投票意欲都有明顯的上升,尤其是立選,投票率增幅尤其驚人,遠高於中年及老年人的增幅;

二、年輕人對立法會選舉的投票意欲,要遠遠高於區議會選舉。

今個星期,通過整理兩個於2012年及2016年立法會選舉後所作的研究,再點出年輕人投票行為模式的另外一些重要特徵。

<u>愈年輕愈投票泛民 愈年長愈投票建制</u>

表1是我與同事馬嶽及前同事黃鶴回兩位教授,在2012年立法會選舉後所作的一個研究當中的部分數據。

當中可見,這些數據所呈現出來的圖象,與大家的常識脗合,那就是愈年輕的人,愈會在選舉中投票給泛民;相反,愈年長的人,卻愈會投票給建制派。在青年(18至39歲)組別,有差不多三分之二的人投票給泛民,與投票給建制的,相差42個百分點;至於中年(40至59歲)組別,雖然投票給泛民的仍然佔多,但差距已經明顯收窄,只餘7個百分點;到了老年(60歲或以上)組別,情况更出現逆轉,投票給建制的已經反佔多數,而且多出近12個百分點。

青年人初出茅廬,尤其是剛離開學校(當中相當比例指的是大學),仍比較理想化,心態上仍是比較嚮往民主、自由、人權等理念,對權威反感,因此投票時,也較鍾情民主派;至於建制派那套保守政治論述,不易聽得入耳,亦因此很難投建制派一票。

但中年人要「撐起頭家」,需面對生活壓力,供樓、畀家用、照顧高堂、負擔子女教育開支,慢慢就變得比較現實,亦更易接受建制派強調安定、繁榮、和諧的那套保守政治論述,於是也有不少人投建制派一票。

到了老年人,隨着步入暮年,他們不單心態上變得比中年人更保守,更抗拒轉變以至「激烈」的東西,且很多早年未有機會接受良好教育,對民主、自由、人權等理念比較「無感」,且大多數是早年大陸移民,較易被「愛國」、民族主義那套打動;最後,更是建制派「蛇齋餅糭」政治攻略的主要市場所在,於是更大比例的投建制派一票。

<u>那麼本土/自決派出現之後又如何?</u>

2012年立選,本土/自決派仍未成氣候;但到了2016年立選,卻變得來勢洶洶,他們甚至聲言要與傳統泛民、建制「三分天下」。那麼不同年齡層,尤其是青年人,他們的投票取向又出現了怎樣的變化呢?

表2是港大民意研究計劃在2016年立法會選舉後所作的一個研究當中的部分數據。

當中可見,在青年組別,投給「泛民+本土/自決派」的,與2012年那個研究一樣,都是佔了三分之二左右,且有所上升,由上屆的64.8%,上升至今屆的67.58%;相反,愈年長的人,卻愈會投票給建制派,到了老年組別,情况更出現逆轉,投票給建制的已經反佔多數,同樣多出近12個百分點。

但更重要的是,如果我們把「泛民+本土/自決派」分拆為溫和泛民(民主黨、公民黨、工黨、民協等)、激進泛民(人社同盟)、本土/自決派(熱普城、青政、眾志等)三大板塊,我們更能仔細看到青年人的投票取向。

<u>青年人對本土/自決派尤為鍾情</u>

從表2中可見,青年對本土/自決派最為鍾情,三成人投票給他們,冠於所有政治板塊;如果把「激進泛民+本土/自決派」合併來計,更進一步高達四成多,高於溫和泛民的兩成半,更遑論建制派的不足兩成。

這和大家的常識脗合,那就是青年人是本土/自決派的主要票源,最為鍾情本土、自決及其他激進政治主張,最為躁動不安、急於求變,易為這些激進政治力量所動員和吸納。相反,老年人卻對他們最為抗拒,亦最少投票給他們,只有5%。

我相信有讀者會問,前述我們在整理數據時,把年輕組別定為18至39歲,但如果進一步收窄為18至29歲,那就是真的剛離開校門最年輕熱血的那個年紀,情况又如何呢?表3我們整理了有關數字。

從表3中可見,我們看到情况更加一面倒,18至29歲這群人,有高達八成支持「泛民+本土/自決派」!他們更對本土/自決派最為鍾情,四成人投票給本土/自決派;如果把「激進泛民+本土/自決派」合併來計,更進一步高達五成,即是每兩票就有一票投給他們!

這似乎真的應驗了一句:愈年輕,愈激進。

(本文部分數據由港大民意研究計劃提供,特此鳴謝港大民研計劃以及鍾庭耀和Edward Tai)

(傘運前後年輕人的投票模式剖析 三之二)

2016

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傘運前後年輕人的投票模式剖析/

明報
觀點:筆陣
2017-05-04

文﹕蔡子強、陳雋文

過去一年,筆者在本欄分別撰文,以2015年區議會選舉及2016年2月立法會新界東補選的投票數據,來看看一個大家都關心的課題,那就是:雨傘運動後,年輕人的投票意欲有否改變?

結果發現,以區議會選舉而言,縱然2015年比2011年有所上升,但年輕人的投票率仍然遠低於長者,即年輕人的投票意欲要低於長者。同時,年輕選票佔全港整體選票數目的百分比,亦同樣低於長者,即年輕選票的影響力亦低於長者選票。

那麼立法會選舉又如何?在新東補選中,相對2015年區選,年輕人的投票率出現了勁升,反而老年的卻有所下跌;同時,年輕選票佔整體選票的百分比,亦超越了長者,即年輕選票的影響力大過了長者選票。

當然以上說的只是一次補選,未必作得準。那麼到了正式立法會選舉又如何?

較早之前,選舉事務處終於公開了今屆立法會選舉的投票數據,但近幾個月,筆者都忙於在本欄撰寫有關特首選舉的文章,到近日才有空整理數據,再結合上屆立選以及兩屆區選,共4次選舉的投票數據,終於可以勾畫出一個比較全面,比較雨傘運動前後香港不同年齡層的投票面貌。且在這裏與大家分享。

22

如果細閱表1,就年輕人的投票行為模式而言,我們可以察覺到兩大重要現象:

傘運後年輕人投票意欲明顯上升

首先,在雨傘運動之後,年輕人無論在區選或立選,投票意欲都有明顯的上升。年輕人(18至40歲),以區選而論,傘運前的投票率是30.83%,傘運後則是37.6%;至於立選,傘運前的投票率是48.52%,傘運後更升至57.72%!增幅尤其驚人,遠高於中年(41至60歲)及老年人(61歲或以上)的增幅。

這反映了,雨傘運動確實減低了過去年輕人的政治冷感,讓他們較以往更加關注政治與選舉,投票意欲有所增強,收窄了與中年及老年人間的差距。

當然,這裏只看到傘運後一屆區選和立選的數字。大家會問,隨着時間過去,傘運慢慢丟淡,年輕人的投票意欲會否逐漸「打回原形」?還是,年輕人的投票行為已經出現了根本轉變?這便要假以時日才能夠有答案。

年輕人立選投票意欲遠高於區選

其次,年輕人對立法會選舉的投票意欲,要遠遠高於區議會選舉。年輕人在2011年區選的投票率,只有30.83% ,但在緊接的2012年立選,卻升至48.52%;在2015年區選的投票率,只有37.6%,但在緊接的2016年立選,更升至57.72%!

雖然,中年人和老年人,同樣是對立選投票的意欲要高於對區選,但兩種選舉間的差距,明顯沒有年輕人的那麼顯著。

我相信這反映了幾點:

(1)年輕人對地區事務的興趣,遠遠不及對政治或社經等中央議題的興趣,因此影響了他們在區選的投票意欲;

(2)再者,立選有更多他們想投票支持的候選人,如「傘兵」、本土自決派、年輕候選人等,讓他們也更踴躍投票(這方面且留待下星期再詳細剖析);以及

(3)年輕人還未養成一個每次選舉都去投票的穩定習慣,因此即使今次在立選投了票,並不意味他們下次區選時,會自動走入票站。

順帶一提,以青年、中年、老年3個年齡層來說,以老年人的投票習慣最為穩定,無論傘運前後,以及兩級議會間,投票率的差異都最小。

年輕選票在立選較區選影響為大

那麼,年輕選票究竟在本地選舉所起的影響有多大?能否左右大局?究竟是年輕還是中年抑或是老年的選票比重較大?在兩級選舉是否有所不同?要回答這些問題,且讓我們再看看有關數據。

從表2可見,在2015年區選,年輕人的選票只佔整體比重的四分之一(24.77%),不單低於中年所佔的四成(42.12%),亦低於老年所佔的三分之一(33.11%);但到了2016年立選,情况卻有所逆轉,因為其投票率的飈升,所以選票佔整體比重也上升至接近三分之一(30.87%),雖然仍低於中年所佔的四成(40.46%),但卻已追過老年所佔的不足三成(28.67%)。

所以簡單來說,中年選票是選舉中所佔比重最大,最左右大局的一塊,無論兩級議會選舉,也都如此。至於年輕及年老選票,表現卻並不如此一致,在兩級議會選舉有所不同,後者在區選佔優,相反前者卻在立選反壓過對方。

再加上立選採用比例代表制,兼且是最大餘額法,因此只要拿到一成甚至是幾個百分點選票,便大有可能拿到一個議席。因此,年輕選票在立選更有可為。

至於年輕人又究竟較傾向在立選中投票支持哪些政團和候選人?是否真的是激進民主和本土自決派?因篇幅關係,留待下星期再談。

(二之一)

[蔡子強、陳雋文]


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選委會選舉啟示

2016年12月17日

信報財經新聞
政局筆記
2016-12-17

江麗芬

回歸以來,香港已先後舉行4次選委會選舉,能夠擁有一票選特首的選委,應是港人非常羨慕的「資格」,可是投票選出選委的氣氛一直冷冷清清。何解?

香港人挑通眼眉,明知即使盡了責任投了票,對特首人選的影響根本有限,最終還是由北京欽定,於是也就無謂浪費時間全力參與了。不過,上周日(11日)的選委會選舉投票率忽然飆升至46.53%,有10萬多人投票,遠比過往任何一次選委會選舉為高。

醒目港人 今次發熱

眾所周知,雖然特首選舉方式未有改變,仍是由選委會的1200人選出特首,但今次的選民忽然熱情起來,就算投票前兩天,行政長官梁振英突然宣布不會競逐連任,也無阻選民的投票決心。

這情況,反映他們對香港未來的意願,就算未能改變特首人選的大局,也要向北京發出一個重要的政治訊息;令這個政治訊息更為明確的,正是選委會的投票結果。

打着ABC(Anyone But CY)旗號的民主300+,一直節節領先,取得325席,結果反映社會對現任特首的管治不滿,亦表達過去4年多對香港整體管治情況有意見;選委會選民今次一改態度,積極投票,就是要讓北京知道,換人的同時,也須轉換過去4年多的治港策略,下任特首不能延續過去4年多的管治手腕。

當然,有建制派於選舉結果揭盅後,不以為然地說,民主派只取得300多票,相對於支持穩定、未有祭出ABC大纛的建制派,卻可得逾800票,所以民主派的300多票只屬少數。如果把要求改變的民主派的300多席放在選委會當中計算的話,所佔比例確實只有四分之一多一點,算是少數;再者,單憑300多票也只能提名兩人參選,絕對未有能力讓任何人當選特首,可是如果再看看這300多人從哪些界別勝出,從而比較各方支持基礎,便可以看到民主派勝選背後有其民意基礎。

民主派在今次選委會選舉中,在23個需要投票競逐的界別中,有6個界別全數取下所有席位,這些界別分別是教育界、衞生服務界、高等教育界、資訊科技界、法律界及社會福利界;這6個界別跟商界等多個界別不同的是,容許個人投票。

有權投票的選民較多,共有11.9萬人,佔整個選委會能夠投票的選民人數幾近一半。而民主派在同樣容許個人投票的會計界,在30席中亦成功取得26席,差不多佔大多數;梁振英曾視為「票倉」的建築、測量、都市規劃及園境界及醫學界,也在個人投票的機制下,泛民主派亦在兩個界別的各30席中,分別贏取25及19席。

可見,民主派雖然在1200人選委中只屬少數,但只是選舉制度使然;在以團體代表選出選委的界別中,建制派自然壟斷差不多所有位置,一旦容許個人投票的話,選民便會選擇一些要求改變現狀、且立場較鮮明的民主派候選人。這現象即使未必能完全反映整體社會聲音,至少能夠反映社會精英或中產階層的大多數意見,因為有機會投票的,都是隸屬專業界別,擁有專業資格或一定學歷水平的人士,他們的取向大可折射出社會中產階層和知識分子的意見。

因此,民主派的選委即使未有力推選出一名特首,他們代表的聲音,北京無論如何也不應視而不見,更不要錯誤閱讀當選民主派的選委只佔整體少數而漠視他們的要求;相反,北京更應小心閱讀今次選委會結果,從而更明白香港人的想法。

投票飆升 反映意願

今次選委會選舉,同樣打正民主旗號參選的人當中,背景與訴求也非完全一致,當中有程度之別。其中,像參選法律界選委的民主思路湯家驊,雖然本身是資深大律師,也曾任大律師公會主席,先後多次成功循地區直選躋身立法會,但今次選委會選舉卻遇上滑鐵盧,未能當選。

這由於他未有加入民主派協調名單內,難獲支持;同時更因為他過往在釋法等事情上對北京採取較理解和同情的態度,跟現時社會或至少在法律界內的民情不一致,甚至惹人懷疑他是否已轉向建制,才令他落敗。湯家驊跟其他同樣不滿現況但取態溫和的參選人都選情不利,反映社會對於特區政府與北京的不信任。

可是,這不代表選民情願支持立場較激進的候選人;看那些表明要投白票以示對制度不滿的參選人,幾近全軍覆沒,便可知一二。相反,能夠當選的民主派選委,立場未至像湯家驊般溫和的候選人,也能夠高票當選。像是在教育界以2.6萬多票最高票當選的民主黨張文光,他在政圈多年,立場與作風眾所周知,就是堅持爭取民主的同時,也不贊成港獨,同時也願意跟中央在有原則下溝通。

這反映社會的氣氛感到非常不滿時,仍希望以務實方式為香港尋求出路。至於出路是什麼,各人或許有不同想法,甚至還未想出方法,但至少從大家帶着明知不可而為之的精神積極投票,可見各人心意是要讓香港走出困局,越過萬重山。


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Carrie Lam, the presumed next leader of Hong Kong, is no clone of divisive Leung Chun-ying

CommentInsight & Opinion
2017-03-21
Gary Cheung says the former chief secretary just needs to bring back her inclusive leadership style that in the past has helped to defuse, or at least set out to defuse, tension in society

 

The support of Hong Kong’s richest man, Li Ka-shing, and his sons for Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor could be the last nail in the coffin for her rival John Tsang Chun-wah’s campaign to be chief executive.

For weeks, there had been speculation that Li is a supporter of Tsang’s and that he and his sons may cast their vote for him in the secret ballot on Sunday to select Hong Kong’s next leader. People in favour of the former financial secretary had hoped that support from the Li family could encourage more pro-establishment electors to vote for the popular underdog as well.

That hope has now been dashed.

The Post has learned that National People’s Congress chairman Zhang Dejiang ( 張德江 ) last month successfully persuaded the Li family to vote for Lam, who is seen as Beijing’s preferred candidate.

This is a timely reminder that realpolitik reigns in the chief executive poll.

Some Tsang supporters believe President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) reticence on the matter so far may indicate Lam is just Zhang’s choice. But an understanding of Chinese politics suggests that no major decision like choosing Hong Kong’s leader could be made by anybody except Xi, who is now the most powerful Communist Party leader since Mao Zedong (毛澤東).

Nevertheless, while Beijing’s all-out effort to support Lam makes clear that she is the “anointed” candidate, Hongkongers should not suppose that their views carry no weight in the eyes of Beijing. Since the annual meeting of the National People’s Congress in March last year, Beijing has been monitoring public opinion in Hong Kong on likely candidates to be the next chief executive. Noting the opposition to Leung Chun-ying, mainland officials tasked with gathering intelligence were particularly interested in how Hongkongers viewed Tsang and Lam.

Leung’s announcement that he would not seek re-election is a testament to Beijing’s conciliatory approach towards Hong Kong. Hongkongers’ overwhelming opposition to Leung and the reluctance of a substantial number of pro-establishment figures to back him for a second term were factors that contributed to Beijing’s decision to look for an alternative.

The central government’s preference for Lam stems from its desire for a chief executive who has the capability and commitment to tackle thorny issues and, to a lesser extent, someone relatively acceptable to Hongkongers. As Beijing expects the next chief executive to have the ability to handle the complicated situation in Hong Kong in the next few years, it has reservations about Tsang’s laid-back leadership style and his tendency to avoid controversial issues.

Despite Lam’s nickname “CY 2.0”, I am reasonably optimistic that she would make a better chief executive than Leung in terms of bridging social divides – if she could restore her inclusive leadership style and problem-solving skills evident before the failed electoral reform in 2015.

In July 2007, Lam, then the secretary for development, took the bold move to join a debate with activists at a public forum at Queen’s Pier to persuade the angry crowd to disperse and allow the work to demolish the pier to start. Her presence at that critical moment helped calm the crowds and defuse the tension.

Further to her credit, Lam liaised with middlemen, like University of Hong Kong academic Joseph Chan Cho-wai and former president of the University of Hong Kong students’ union Gloria Chang Wan-ki, to set up dialogue with student leaders at the forefront of the Occupy Central protests in 2014.

At the televised dialogue with student leaders on October 21, Lam told them the government would submit a report to the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office to reflect public sentiment since the protests began on September 28. The government would also consider setting up a multi-party platform for talks on constitutional development beyond 2017, she said. But the talks eventually failed to reap rewards because the gap between the two sides was just too wide to be bridged.

One of Lam’s urgent tasks after landing the top job – if she is selected, as expected – will be to set herself apart from Leung by demonstrating a more inclusive governing style.

In an interview with online media ourTV.hk last Thursday, Lam told the programme host and former legislator Emily Lau Wai-hing that she was interested in the model of the eight-party coalition that Lau spearheaded in 2001 to push for policies that enjoy support from across the political aisle. The coalition successfully forced the government of the day to agree to measures such as a waiver of property rates and quarantine of residents in a block in Amoy Gardens in Kowloon Bay, at the height of the severe acute respiratory syndrome outbreak in 2003.

I hope Lam means what she says and shows more flexibility in dealing with the pan-democrats after she becomes chief executive.

This is my last column for the Post, where I have worked for nearly 17 years. As someone who has been observing Hong Kong politics for more than two decades, it pains me to witness the vicious cycle precipitated by Beijing’s growing assertiveness on Hong Kong affairs and the resultant backlashes by Hongkongers in recent years.

I believe the persistent expression of views through peaceful means is more forceful and effective in pushing change than hurling bricks in the streets. Deliberate challenges to Beijing’s bottom line, like advocating Hong Kong independence and using abusive language during any oath-taking ceremony, only do a disservice to the fight for democracy.

Yet, as I told some Beijing officials and mainland experts on Hong Kong, Beijing badly needs to create room for moderates in Hong Kong to ensure the sustainability of the “one country, two systems” framework and break the vicious cycle.

Gary Cheung is the Post’s political editor


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Six ways a coalition would be a winning combination for Hong Kong

CommentInsight & Opinion
2016-12-05
Keith Hui explains how an inclusive administration would give both opposition parties and voters a real voice and stake in making the government work

 

A coalition government would increase the space for political compromise, in the sense that the chief executive would have plenty of bargaining chips (policy bureau posts) to negotiate with sensible political parties to engage in policymaking for long-term stability and prosperity. Illustration: Craig StephensHong Kong’s chief executive should consider upgrading the “principal officials accountability system” – introduced by Tung Chee-hwa in 2002 to appoint illustrious worthies alongside administrative officers to take up policy secretary posts – to an inclusive “coalition government”.

Recruiting more lawmakers ­affiliated with the major political parties, including the Democratic Party, to join such a coalition cabinet would offer a chance to solve the present political conundrum.

Coalition governments are common in Europe; many countries there have had a proportional representation mechanism for decades. For example, the current German government, named as the third “grand coalition” since the second world war, is composed of Angela Merkel’s CDU/CSU and the Social Democrat SPD, thus securing a dominating majority (504 of 598 seats) in the 18th Bundestag.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel arrives for a regional conference of her Christian Democratic Union party in Heidelberg on November 28. She leads the third “grand coalition” government in Germany since the second world war. Photo: EPA

There would be at least six advantages from having Hong Kong lawmakers, from both functional and geographical constituencies, and district councillors appointed to the position of chief secretary and more than half the ministerial posts (including deputy and assistant ranks) inside the 13 policy bureaus.

It would mean more politicians like Undersecretary for the Environment Christine Loh Kung-wai, Transport and Housing Secretary Anthony Cheung Bing-leung; and Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Undersecretary Ronald Chan Ngok-pang inside the government.

The first advantage is that the chief executive would have more flexibility to negotiate with all those who faithfully support the “one country two systems” principle and recognise China’s unquestionable sovereignty over Hong Kong, so as to command a two-thirds majority in the Legislative Council.

The recent oath-taking saga has revealed the Democratic Party’s consistent position in staying firmly away from the independence movement advocated by localists. The Democrats, in fact, had an excellent track record under the leadership of the late Szeto Wah for their patriotism as well as willingness to compromise with the government on many fronts. Moderates such as Fred Li Wah-ming and Sin Chung-kai would be ideal candidates to join a coalition government (after nominally resigning from the party) to represent the Democrats.

Fred Li would be ideal for a coalition government. Photo: Edmund SoThe more radical section of the party may disagree with such a move. However, unless they want to remain an opposition party forever, being assimilated into the coalition government is the only way to realise their goals regarding, say, social welfare and labour protection. In other words, only if the Democratic Party is willing to join a coalition government can it turn itself into a genuine political party.

This also applies to parties such as Regina Ip Lau Suk-yee’s New People’s Party, the Liberal Party and the various groups within the functional constituencies. This is actually the second advantage of a coalition government, in that it provides a formal channel for parties to attain governing power under certain conditions, thus fulfilling their ambition to become policymakers.

Also, as these politicians have the chance to analyse issues from both sides, they would tend to be practical rather than radical, realistic rather than idealistic and pragmatic rather than hypocritical.

The third advantage would be evoking the general public’s sense of belonging, security, achievement and closeness to the government, given that a certain number of politicians elected by the public would now be working as policymakers to initiate concrete action to improve their livelihoods.

Furthermore, if this happened generation after generation, voters would tend to distance themselves from radicals who could paralyse the legislature. Any sensible voter would always prefer those who can actually take care of their interests over those who merely provide lip service.

The fourth merit is that there would be no need to amend the Basic Law. The chief executive would continue to have all the necessary discretion, subject to Beijing’s approval, to appoint people to fill various posts, at certain ranks, while deciding how long they should serve. Professionals and civil servants could still be appointed to take up posts as, say, secretary for justice, security, financial services and the civil service. These non-politicians would counterbalance the influence of their political peers, when necessary, through budgeting or voicing realistic concerns.

Moreover, in a case where a secretary committed a serious mistake, immediate resignation would still be an option to help relieve pressure on the government.

The fifth advantage, and the most important one, will be increasing the space for political compromise, in the sense that the chief executive would have plenty of bargaining chips (policy bureau posts) to negotiate with sensible political parties to engage in policy implementation for long-term stability and prosperity. This could alleviate confrontations between the establishment and opposition parties. This is also how coalition governments work in many countries.

In the wake of the independence movement, the chief executive needs to spend more time improving mainland-Hong Kong relations. The chief secretary should therefore shoulder more responsibility to oversee internal affairs, from housing policy to legislation on Article 23. Appointing a popularly elected person to take up this position and lead the coalition government could open more gateways for cooperation among reasonable political groups for a consensus. This is the sixth advantage, so that political pressure is not overly concentrated on the chief executive.

Without a breakthrough, Hong Kong might have to rely on selling souvenirs to make a living soon.

Keith K C Hui is a Hong Kong-based commentator